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Abstract  
Accountability - constraints on the government’s use of political power - is one of the 
cornerstones of good governance. However, conceptual stretching and a lack of reliable 
measures have limited cross-national research and comparisons regarding the role of both 
accountability writ large and its different sub-types. To address this research gap, we use the V-
Dem dataset and Bayesian statistical models to develop new ways to conceptualize and measure 
accountability and its core dimensions. We provide indices capturing the extent to which 
governments are accountable to citizens (vertical accountability), other state institutions 
(horizontal accountability) and the media and civil society (diagonal accountability), as well as an 
aggregate index that incorporates the three sub-types.  These indices cover virtually all countries 
from 1900 to today. We demonstrate the validity of our new measures by analyzing trends from 
key countries, as well as by demonstrating that the measures are positively related to 
development outcomes such as health and education. 
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Introduction  
Accountability is a concept of cross-disciplinary academic importance, and is also directly 
relevant to many policy decisions. Scholars of political science emphasize the importance of 
accountability in preventing the abuse of political power and the continuing concern for checks 
and oversight in the state (Schedler 1999: 13). Similarly, international organizations such as the 
World Bank have long argued that officials and bodies need to be held accountable for their 
actions in order to ensure that they provide public goods in a committed, impartial and effective 
manner (WB Institute 2005). Indeed, building accountable institutions was recently singled out 
as one targets of Sustainable Development Goal 16 (UN Resolution: A/Res/70/1).  
However, cross-national research on accountability suffers from two main impediments: 
(1) conceptual ambiguity, and (2) limited data availability. (1) Conceptual ambiguity: The wide use of 
the concept has resulted in a surge of meanings and dimensions associated with accountability, 
making it seem “ever-expanding” (Mulgan 2000) and “over-stretched” (Lindberg 2013). The 
challenges to defining and measuring the concept stem from its multi-dimensional character, 
which make its core and meaning difficult to define and distinguish from other related concepts 
such as democratic or representative governments. (2) Limited data availability: Currently, the 
World Bank’s Voice and Accountability Index is the only cross-national accountability index 
available. This index has been criticized for conceptual inconsistency and lack of transparency in 
its construction (Thomas 2009; Langbein/Knack 2008; Apazaa 2009). It is also limited in scope, 
covering only the years after 1996. Therefore, researchers have used measures of democracy writ 
large to proxy accountability, as opposed to accountability and its constituent units specifically 
(Adam et al. 2011, Harding et al. 2010, Gerring et al. 2012). 
In order to address these shortcomings, we suggest a novel way to conceptualize and 
systematically measure the accountability of the government. Building on the Schedler (1999) 
and Lindberg (2013), we define accountability as constraints on the government’s use of political 
power through requirements for justification of its actions and potential sanctions. We organize 
the sub-types of accountability in regard to the relative positions of different groups of actors, 
incorporating both the common distinction between vertical and horizontal components and a 
third sub-type of diagonal accountability. Vertical accountability refers to the ability of a state’s 
population to hold its government accountable through elections and political parties. 
Horizontal accountability concerns the capacity of state institutions such as legislatures and the 
judiciary to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and 
punishing improper behavior. However, agents of vertical and horizontal accountability – 
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parliaments, voters, courts – often rely on the input of media and civil society in order to 
preform effectively, for instance the reports of investigative journalists (Grimes 2013). Based on 
Goetz and Jenkins (2010) we call this third dimension - oversight by civil society organizations 
and media - diagonal accountability due to its intermediary nature.  
The Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem) data set (Coppedge et al. 2016) allows us 
to create accountability indices that precisely model our conceptual notions with unprecedented 
cross-national and temporal coverage. We aggregate conceptually relevant V-Dem indicators to 
separate indices of vertical, horizontal and diagonal accountability. To do so, we incorporate 
both hierarchical and structural equation components to Bayesian factor analytic models to 
account for both the nested nature of these indicators and the interaction between the de facto 
and de jure institutions that influence accountability. Finally, we create a composite index of 
accountability from these indices to allow scholars to estimate their aggregate effect. 
The paper proceeds as follows: drawing on the existing literature, we define 
accountability and its core dimensions (Part 1). Based on this discussion, we present our 
operationalization of the concept, lay out the aggregation strategy and introduce the indices (Part 
2). Finally, we assess the resulting measures with empirical tests (Part 3).  
 
Part 1: Accountability 
1.1. What is accountability?  
 
Scholars commonly understand political accountability as constraints on the use of power 
(Lindberg 2013). Accountability describes a relationship between two actors or groups of actors, 
where “A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions 
and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct” 
(Schedler 1999: 17). The two main dimensions of accountability in Schedler’s (1999) 
conceptualization are answerability and enforcement. The former aspect underlines the 
mechanisms of monitoring and oversight of political institutions, and includes the right to 
demand information as well as explanation and argumentation for them. The latter concept 
involves rewarding good behavior and punishing improper behavior through sanctions.  
As a radial concept, accountability does not have a conceptual core of necessary and 
sufficient conditions (Schedler 1999: 17). Sub-types of such radial concepts might not share any 
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attributes with each other (Collier and Mahoney 1993: 848). For instance, there may be acts of 
accountability, which involve only the provision of information but do not include sanctions 
(Schedler 1999: 17, Lindberg 2013: 210). Investigative journalists are unable to directly sanction 
politicians but their reports and research are nevertheless crucial for holding governments to 
account.  
Related but distinct concepts are responsibility, responsiveness and representation. While 
the term accountability denotes the concern with the external functions of scrutiny, requiring 
justifications and imposing sanctions, responsibility refers to internal functions of personal 
culpability, morality and ethics (Mulgan 2000, citing Uhr 1993 and Bovens 1998). Responsive 
governments are those that adopt policies preferred by citizens, while representative 
governments are those that pursue the interest of the majority (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 
1999: 8 – 10). In contrast, issues of government accountability typically relate to questions like: 
how voters can make elected representatives answer for their policies and accept electoral 
retribution, how legislators can scrutinize the actions of the executive and make them answerable, 
and finally, how the public can seek redress from governing institutions (Mulgan 2000: 556). 
 
Further ambiguity stems from the fact that accountability relationships may exist 
between very different types of actors, for instance in the public or private sector. For our 
purposes we are concerned with the accountability of the executive branch of the government 
including the head of state or government, the cabinet, ministries and top civil servants 
(Coppedge et al. 2016: 413). As a result, we understand accountability as constraints on the 
government’s use of political power through requirements for justification of its actions and 
potential sanctions.  
One common way to organize the sub-types of accountability is to divide accountability 
mechanisms in regard to the spatial direction between the actors (Lindberg 2013: 212). 
O’Donnell’s widely used classification distinguishes between vertical accountability, which 
describes a relationship between unequals – citizens and elected officials, and horizontal, which 
refers to relationship between more or less equally standing institutions (O’Donnell 1998). We 
adopt this classification and develop it further by adding one important dimension – diagonal 
accountability - that focuses on the oversight function of non-state actors such as media and 
civil society. We also make a contribution by suggesting specific ways to conceptualize and 
measure the core aspects of government accountability. 
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Vertical accountability refers to the ability of a state’s population to hold its 
government accountable through elections and political parties. It focuses on the relationship 
between citizens and their elected representatives (Fox 2015, Mainwaring 2003, Schedler 1999). 
Well-established theories going back to authors like Schattschneider (1942) and Schumpeter 
(1950) highlight elections as the main mechanism by which people exert control over politicians 
and political decisions. By voting for competing candidates running on the tickets of various 
political parties, citizens can select political leaders and punish them for improper behavior. This 
establishes accountability mechanisms based on incentives for leaders who want to gain and 
keep power (Skaaning 2015: 5). In order to be re-elected, incumbents should aim to meet voters’ 
expectations in terms of policy- and decision-making (Olson 2000). In addition to voting, 
political parties provide an important mediating function in establishing conditions for vertical 
accountability. Strong and organized parties constrain politicians’ behavior to the effect that they 
fulfill the party program and prevent illicit activities that would hurt the party’s reputation 
(Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011; Svolik, 2012). Parties are also instrumental in minimizing policy 
volatility by committing to a coherent line of action (Bernhard et al. 2015: 8-10). Vertical 
accountability thus includes the ability to organize in political parties and participate in elections. 
 
By contrast, the oversight that different institutions in a political system exercise on each 
other is commonly termed horizontal accountability. Typical institutions of horizontal 
accountability include legislative committees, which question governments about their actions 
and have the power to hold them accountable by initiating a vote of no-confidence. The 
horizontal accountability mechanism thus emphasizes the separation of powers in a state. Such 
separation of powers prevents its abuse by allowing other state institutions to demand 
information, question officials and, possibly, punish improper behavior (Rose-Ackerman 1996). 
In order to establish horizontal accountability, state agencies - legislative, and judicial branches, 
as well as various oversight agencies, ombudsmen, prosecutor generals - should not only have 
the legal power but also the will to oversee the actions of other agencies and impose sanctions 
(O’Donnell 1998, p. 117f). We are here mainly concerned with the accountability of the 
government to other oversight bodies.  
Vertical and horizontal accountability reflect mainly the role of formal institutions – 
elections, parliaments, courts – in government oversight. However, effectiveness of vertical and 
horizontal forms of accountability by themselves is limited (Goetz and Jenkins 2010, p. 364). 
Such formal institutions of accountability may lack the capacity to continuously oversee the day-
to-day activity of the whole state apparatus. Research on corruption and voting has shown that 
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in practice citizens often fail to punish corrupt regimes through elections (Choi and Woo 2010: 
250). 
 
Non-state actors can fill in the accountability gap that formal institutions leave. Citizens, 
civil society organizations (CSOs), and an independent media can use a broad range of actions 
and mechanisms to hold the government and public officials accountable, such as “public 
demonstrations, protests, investigative journalism, and public interest lawsuits” (Malena et al 
2004, p.3). Thus, citizens and journalists can serve an important “fire alarm” function by 
monitoring government offices and reporting irregularities (Grimes 2013, p.382). In addition, 
when important policy is being considered, independent public deliberations among a wide 
range of groups, such as participatory public policy-making or budget discussions, constitute 
other means of furthering accountability outside of elections. Peruzzotti and Smulowitz among 
others (2006, p. 4, 10) underline the growth of this alternative political control, using informal 
tools (social mobilization and media exposure) to activate institutional tools (e.g. legal oversight 
by controlling agencies). 
The term social accountability is frequently used to describe the direct involvement of 
CSOs and the media in the realization of accountability towards politicians and state institutions 
beyond formal political participation (Malena et al. 2004, p. 3). However, the success of the 
actions of civil society organizations and the media ultimately depend on whether the institutions 
of vertical and horizontal accountability respond to them (Mainwaring and Welna 2003). For 
example, after journalists expose a corrupt politician he can only lose his office only if party 
leaders withdraw support or voters decide to act upon the accusations (vertical accountability 
connection). Similarly, a grass-roots initiative to change a particular law is adopted only with the 
support of sufficient number of legislators (horizontal accountability connection). Therefore, we 
follow Goetz and Jenkins (2010) and describe the civil society and media’s involvement in the 
oversight of public officials as diagonal accountability (Figure 1). Such accountability relationships 
function diagonally, through their effect on vertical and horizontal accountability (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Direction of accountability relationships 
 
Three additional conceptual clarifications are important to note. First, we are concerned 
with de facto accountability only. In order to ensure effective accountability of any kind, oversight 
mechanisms need to work in practice and not just exist as inconsequential de jure regulations and 
institutions. For example, elections must be free and fair in practice in order to give citizens the 
full power to sanction elected officials.  
Second, our concept of accountability is closely related to prominent notions of 
democracy. For example, Schmitter and Karl (1991) define democracy as a “system of 
governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, 
acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.” 
However, governments can also be accountable to some degree in non-democratic states 
(Lindberg 2013: 209). For example, grass-roots movements can emerge in authoritarian settings 
(e.g. Solidarity in Poland or African National Congress in South Africa). Similarly, the exercise of 
repeated elections, even if they are not completely free and fair, can bring about improved 
political accountability (Lindberg 2006, 2009; Roessler and Howard 2006). Nevertheless, 
accountability is likely to improve the more democratic its components are. For instance, it is 
plausible to assume that free and fair elections bring about higher levels of accountability than 
manipulated ones. Furthermore, our notion of accountability does not include constraints on 
governments from actors which are themselves not held accountable such as the military or 
religious leaders.  
Finally, our definition and conceptualization of accountability focuses on the national 
government. Therefore, it does not capture the variation in the strength of accountability sub-
nationally or across sectors. While our approach limits opportunities for microanalysis, it lends 
itself for analysis of accountability opportunities at broad systemic level, in particular in 
comparative perspective and for looking at changes over time. Studying development of 
Government Oversight Bodies
Voters and Parties Media and CSOs
 10 
accountability at systemic level poses an interest in and of itself, but also allows for analyzing 
how accountability affects the performance of countries overall.  
 
1.2 Existing indices of accountability are not sufficient   
The World Bank Voice and Accountability Indicator is the only existing accountability index 
with worldwide coverage. As one of six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the index 
aggregates perception-based indicators from various sources (e.g. Freedom House) with the help 
of an Unobserved Components Model (Kaufmann et al. 2010). Depending on data availability, 
the number of sources per observation varies between one and 19 with an average of nine.1 This 
structure makes it difficult to trace what the index is actually capturing and limits comparability 
of the measure across countries. Consequently, critics have argued that the measure - and other 
WGIs - lacks conceptual consistency and validity (Thomas 2009; Langbein/Knack 2008; Apazaa 
2009). The index also has limited temporal coverage, as it only covers 1996 onwards.  
Several other accountability-related indices exist, but they are limited in either cross-
national coverage or the aspect of accountability they cover. For example, Williams (2014) puts 
forward a composite measure of accountability and transparency, covering 1980-present with a 
limited number of countries. The Global Integrity Report introduces a set of indicators on 
government oversight and electoral integrity and anti-corruption, but only covers 33 countries in 
2016.2  The World Bank’s IDA Resource allocation index also provides some information on 
horizontal and social accountability, but only for countries receiving development aid since 
2005.3 Polity IV includes a variable on executive constraints, but this variable covers also non-
democratic forms of constraints such as the ruling party in a one party state or a powerful 
military (Marshall et al. 2013: 24). This diverges from our democracy-related notion of 
accountability.  
In light of the lack of a cross-national accountability index with wide coverage, scholars 
have resorted to wider democracy indices as proxies for accountability for their empirical studies 
                                                
1 Own calculations based on World Bank data taken from Teorell et al. 2016.  
2  Global Integrity (2011); The Global Integrity Report: 2011 – Methodology White Paper,   
https://www.globalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/2011_GIR_Meth_Whitepaper.pdf (access 12. 
August 2016), p.5  
3 The World Bank, IDA Resource Allocation Index, http://www.worldbank.org/ida/IRAI-2012.html (access 12 
August 2016).   
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(Adserà et al. 2003). In contrast, the accountability indices we present in this paper will allow 
scholars to directly investigate the causes and effects of different types of accountability.  
 
Part 2: The Indices 
2.1 Operationalization and Aggregation strategy 
Based on the conceptual framework outlined above, we operationalize each type of 
accountability as being a composite of multiple indicators from the V-Dem data set (Coppedge 
et al. 2016), and overall accountability as being an aggregation of these types.4 The functional 
form of all types of accountability requires going beyond a standard Bayesian factor analysis 
framework. Our accountability indices include hierarchically nested variables, since we assume 
that the influence of many measures on a type of accountability is mediated by their relationship 
to other conceptually similar measures. Moreover, some variables – for instance on election 
quality - are systematically missing in the data because the institutions they capture (e.g. 
elections) do not exist. However, the existence of these institutions  itself is of prime importance 
to accountability. Structural equation modeling accounts for the relative contribution of these 
measures to the overall latent concept being estimated. Our model therefore includes both 
hierarchical and structural equation components. 
In this section, we provide a narrative description of each accountability measure in turn. 
The Methodological Appendix provides an analytical description of the measures and details 
about the aggregation strategy. 
 
2.1.1 Vertical accountability 
Vertical accountability captures the mechanisms of formal political participation in the exercise 
of accountability. Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual scheme for vertical accountability, which 
consists of two main aspects: electoral accountability and political parties.  
 
                                                
4 The V-Dem dataset has world-wide coverage from 1900 to 2012 for over 350 indicators on democracy and 
political systems. While approximately half of the indicators in the V-Dem dataset are based on factual information, 
the other half consists of more subjective expert judgments (Coppedge et al., 2015a). V-Dem relies on more than 
2,500 local and cross-national experts to collect these judgments, which are aggregated through a Bayesian item 
response theory model (Pemstein et al., 2015). 
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Figure 1: Vertical accountability path diagram 
 
We operationalize electoral accountability as measures of 1) the quality of elections in the 
state; 2) the percent of enfranchised population and 3) whether the chief executive is elected. In 
order to capture the de facto opportunity for citizens to sanction politicians through elections, we 
take into account the extent to which 1) there are elections and 2) the degree to which elections 
reflect the will of the people and are not a mere façade. This is especially salient since more than 
half of the current elections in the world violate the basic principles of freedom and fairness 
(Hafner-Burton et al. 2013:152). Therefore, we weight a dichotomous measure of the presence 
of elections in a polity (v2x_elecreg) by measures of clean elections. The underlying assumption 
here is that polities with no elections have worse vertical accountability than a polity that has 
elections, even if they are fraudulent. At the same time, vertical accountability improves with 
election quality. We therefore reflect the quality of national elections with seven variables 
autonomy and capacity of the electoral management body (v2elembaut and v2elembcap); and 
accuracy of the voter registry (v2elrgstry), intentional irregularities conducted by the government 
and opposition (v2elirreg); intimidation and harassment by the government and its agents 
(v2elintim); to what extent the elections were multi-party in practice (v2elmulpar); and an overall 
measure for the freedom and fairness of elections (v2elfrfair). These variables represent a 
modified version of the V-Dem Clean elections index (v2xel_frefair), to which we added the 
variable v2elmulpar, which is theoretically important for accountability, and we removed 
v2elvotbuy and v2elpeace, as they have low loadings to the index.   
Furthermore, we account for both the percentage of the population to which a 
government is accountable and the degree to which a country’s chief executive is accountable 
with variables that directly load to the latent concept. Specifically, we include a measure the 
percentage of people that have the legal right to vote (v2elsuffrage) to capture the degree to 
Vertical Percent su↵rage
Clean elections
Chief executive
Parties
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which some citizens are excluded from the exercise of electoral accountability. Since 
governments that do not subject the chief executive to direct or indirect elections are 
substantially less accountable to voters, we also account for an elected chief executive with a 
binary indicator.5  
Finally, we incorporate the presence and activities of political parties into our estimation 
of vertical accountability. To do so, we estimate an aggregate measure of different variables 
related to the quality of the party system in a polity. First, we capture whether there are barriers 
to forming a party and how restrictive they are (v2psparban and v2psbars), as well as whether 
the opposition parties are independent of the ruling regime (v2psoppaut). As argued above, 
political parties serve an important function to address citizens’ grievances outside of elections as 
a formal forum to gather, coordinate and defend the interests of their followers. Political parties 
also open avenues for vertical participation in countries without elections. 
 
2.1.2 Horizontal accountability 
Horizontal accountability represents the extent to which state institutions are able to hold to 
account the executive branch of the government (head of state, head of government and cabinet 
ministers). Three main institutions are essential in this regard: the legislature, the judiciary, and 
special bodies designed for such a purpose (comptroller general, general prosecutor, or 
ombudsman). Figure 2 illustrates this conceptual scheme.  There is no a priori reason to privilege 
any of these institutions in the measure, so we model them as having potentially the same 
influence on the country year level of horizontal accountability.  
Figure 2: Horizontal accountability path diagram 
 
                                                
5 The chief executive is either the head of state or head of government – whoever has more relative power over the 
appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, as measured by v2ex_hosw. Its appointment is measured by 
v2expathhs, v2ex_legconhos, v2expathhg and v2exaphogp. 
Horizontal Legislature
Other bodies question
executive o cials
Judiciary
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We measure the effect of the judiciary as a composite score of five variables. First, we 
incorporate higher and lower court independence (v2juhcind and v2juncind). These two 
indicators capture the capability of the high respectively lower court to rule impartially in cases 
that are salient to the government. Second, we include two indicators capturing how often the 
government complies with important decisions undertaken by the high court and other courts 
(v2juhccomp and v2jucomp). Finally, we add a measure for whether the executive branch 
respects the constitution (v2exrescon). The resulting composite measure speaks to whether 
members of the executive compromise horizontal accountability by “unlawfully encroaching” 
into legitimate authority of the judiciary branch (Sklar 1999: 55). 
With regard to accountability, the key function of a legislature is to scrutinize 
government officials’ (potential) misconduct by demanding information for their policies and 
decisions, and taking specific actions in case of irregularities. As with quality of elections, we 
assume that polities without legislatures have worse horizontal accountability than polities with 
legislatures.  We therefore weight an indicator of the existence of a parliament (a dichotomized 
version of v2lgbicam) by measures of the degree to which the legislature actually holds the 
executive branch accountable: 1) whether the legislature routinely questions the executive 
(v2lgotovst); and 2) the degree to which a legislature is likely to investigate and produce a 
decision unfavorable to the executive, if the latter were engaged in an illegal or unethical activity 
(v2lginvstp).  
Finally, we include a variable regarding the degree to which other state bodies 
(comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) are likely to investigate and report on 
potential illegal or unethical activities on part of the executive (v2lgotovst). We model this 
indicator as a direct input to the horizontal accountability score since we do not believe that 
states without such bodies and with weak additional oversight bodies necessarily have different 
levels of horizontal accountability.  
The resulting measure of horizontal accountability captures the degree to which a 
network of institutions with legal power to check and balance the executive branch exercise this 
function in practice. 
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2.1.3 Diagonal accountability 
Diagonal accountability represents the extent to which citizens are able to hold a government 
accountable outside of formal political participation. We model this form of accountability as a 
function of media freedom, civil society characteristics, freedom of expression, and the degree to 
which citizens are engaged in politics. Figure 3 demonstrates graphically our conceptualization of 
diagonal accountability. 
Figure 3: Diagonal accountability path diagram 
 
Media freedom represents a composite value with two broad dimensions. The first 
dimension captures the extent to which the government attempts to censor the media 
(v2mecenefm) and information on the Internet (v2mecenefi), as well as the extent to which 
government and other powerful actors harass journalists (v2meharjrn).  These three indicators 
give insights into the questions whether the government attempts to silence the media and thus 
preventing them from exercising their profession. The second dimension is concerned with the 
work of the media itself, thus capturing the extent to which citizens have access to un-biased and 
diverse sources of information, allowing them to objectively inform themselves about the 
policies of the government and the outcomes of these policies. The four indicators we use focus 
on the extent to which: the media criticizes the government at least occasionally (v2mecrit); there 
is bias against opposition candidates (v2mebias); the media offers a wide array of political 
perspectives in their coverage (v2merange); and there is self-censorship on salient issues for the 
government (v2meslfcen).  
The second aggregate measure we use to estimate diagonal accountability regards civil 
society. We use the components of the V-Dem core index of civil society to account for the 
Diagonal
Civil society
organizations
Freedom
of expression
Engaged society
Media
freedom
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opportunity of citizens to channel their interests and potentially oppose the government and its 
policies in an organized way through a robust, self-organized and autonomous civil society 
organizations. More specifically, the indicators included in this index are: popular and voluntary 
participation in CSOs, (v2csprtcpt), government control to the entry and exit of CSOs into the 
public life, (v2cseeorgs), and government oppression of CSOs (v2csreprss).  
Freedom of expression represents a weighted aggregation of male and female freedom of 
discussion in private discussions on political issues without fear of harassment on the part of the 
government, or as result of cultural of customary restrictions (v2cldiscm and v2cldiscw).  The 
inclusion of this measure adds information on whether private citizens can freely discuss 
political issues – a fundamental right and basic prerequisite for citizens to be able to participate 
in any form in the scrutiny of the government. The separate measure for women taps into 
potential specific restrictions to that group, a phenomenon not uncommon in particular in 
traditionalistic societies. We also add an indicator on the freedom of academic and cultural 
expression (v2clacfree). This is a measure on whether censorship and intimidation are frequent 
towards academic activities and cultural expressions, which could otherwise play an important 
role in scrutinizing the government and its activities.  
All of these institutions are composites of multiple indicators, except for engaged society 
(v2dlengage). This indicator gives information on the width and depth of public deliberations 
when important policy changes are being considered. In particular, it assesses to what extend 
non-elite groups and ordinary citizens are discussing major policy issues in an unconstrained 
way.  
 
2.1.4 Accountability 
To create an aggregate measure of accountability, we conduct a hierarchical analysis using the 
sub-index models from the preceding section. This strategy assumes that overall accountability is 
a function of all variables included in the model, though the sub-indices structure this 
relationship. Figure 4 illustrates this conceptualization. 
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Figure 4: Accountability path diagram 
 
 
2.2. The data 
2.2.1 Summary Statistics  
Our validation strategy for the indices is twofold: first, we look at key summary descriptive 
statistics of our indices, including in three specific countries, and second, we demonstrate the 
utility of these measures by investigating the effect of different types of accountability on 
multiple governance outcomes related to human development. Development outcomes are of 
interest to us both because of their substantive importance, and the wide literature that has 
linked accountability to development. 
The four new accountability indices we propose have unprecedented coverage over 
space and time with a total of 66,484 observations from 1900 to 2015 for up to 173 countries 
and territories.  
Figure 5 illustrates the global average development of accountability over time. We see 
three different phases of accountability evolvement in the world - similar to the well-known 
waves of democratization (Huntington 1992). From relatively low average levels in the early 20st 
century, accountability levels decline in the 1930s and 1940s. After World War II, accountability 
improves on global average to levels unparalleled before the War. Finally, with the fall of the 
Iron Curtain governments became more accountable across the world.    
Diagonal
Vertical HorizontalAccountability
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Figure 5: Global Average of our Accountability Indices 1900-2012 
 
Our sub-indices of accountability evolve differently over time. As a global average, 
horizontal accountability is the least volatile sub-index. In the 20s, the yearly global average of 
horizontal accountability almost reaches its all-time average. This relatively high early average 
could be a function of the development of legislatures and courts in many Western countries in 
the late 19th and early 20st century. In the subsequent decades, the horizontal accountability 
index fluctuates slightly and improves drastically only after the fall of Communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe. However, this surge is less pronounced than the changes in social and vertical 
accountability occurring at the same time. The global average of vertical accountability changes 
quickly from very low levels until World War II to medium levels in the 1960s, which reflects the 
extension of suffrage and democratic rights in Western states such as the United States, as well 
as the starting processes of decolonization in Asia and Africa at the time. Diagonal 
accountability evolves in a similar pattern as vertical accountability until the end of World War 
II, at which point vertical accountability improves more rapidly than diagonal accountability. 
This trend suggests that during this period the quality of elections was improved more 
comprehensively than diagonal mechanisms of accountability such as media oversight and 
citizen’s participation.  
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Accountability Indices 1900-2012 
 Accountability Vertical 
Accountability 
Horizontal 
Accountability 
Diagonal 
Accountability 
Accountability  1.0000    
Vertical 
Accountability 
0.917 1.0000   
Horizontal 
Accountability 
0.879 0.724 1.0000  
Diagonal 
Accountability  
0.964 0.824 0.810 1.0000 
 
Table 1 depicts the correlation matrix for the four accountability indices we have 
designed. The table shows that vertical and horizontal accountability are the least correlated sub-
indices, whereas diagonal accountability correlates the most with the other two sub-indices. 
Consequently, the aggregate accountability index evinces great similarity with diagonal 
accountability, which can also be seen in Figure 1. This reflects the nature of institutions of 
diagonal accountability as intermediary mechanisms, which help to reinforce other types of 
accountability (Mechkova, Lührmann, Lindberg 2017). For instance, investigative reports in free 
and critical media can help parliamentarians to uncover and combat corrupt practices.   
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between vertical and horizontal accountability in the 
year 2012. Appendix 1 provides similar figures for the other indices (Figures A.1 and A.2). Recall 
that the measure of vertical accountability heavily discounts countries that have never had 
elections or where there are interruptions in the electoral cycle. Therefore, countries without an 
electoral regime in place are at the bottom of the vertical accountability scale, such as Eritrea and 
Saudi Arabia. Countries that hold severely flawed elections, such as Syria or Turkmenistan, have 
higher vertical accountability than states without electoral regimes, though they have much lower 
values than countries that have better-quality elections.  
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Figure 6: Vertical and Horizontal Accountability in 2012 
 
Note: The red lines represent the global average of the indices in 2012.  
The red lines on Figure 6 give the global average of the depicted indices in 2012. 
Countries in the right hand quadrant have above-average ratings of both vertical and horizontal 
accountability and those in lower left-hand quadrant score below-average for both indices. 
Countries in the lower right-hand quadrant score above average on vertical accountability, but 
below average on horizontal. For example, Ecuador and Guyana have quite developed electoral 
institutions but exhibit weaknesses in parliamentary and judicial oversight. Countries in the 
upper left-hand quadrant score below average on vertical accountability while maintaining 
above-average horizontal oversight institutions. For example, flawed elections impeded vertical 
accountability in Kenya and Uganda, while judicial and parliamentary systems had the ability to 
check other state bodies. OECD countries are concentrated at the top of both indices (see Table 
A.1 in Appendix), which suggests face validity of the measure.   
As discussed above, few existing indicators aim to capture the same concepts as the 
accountability indices offered in this paper. The existing index conceptually closest to our indices 
is the World Bank’s Voice and Accountability from the World Governance Indicator (WGI) 
data set. It correlates strongly with our accountability measure (Table 2). The WGI Voice and 
Accountability index is a composite index of various other indicators mainly in the realm of 
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election quality, media freedom and civil and political rights. The WGI Voice and Accountability 
index does not incorporate measures of horizontal accountability. It is therefore not surprising 
that the table shows that this measure correlates more strongly with our vertical and diagonal 
accountability indices than with our horizontal accountability index. The comparison with 
Freedom House (FH) indicators confirms this analysis. The FH Political Rights score – which is 
often used as an indicator for electoral democracy – correlates strongly with our overall 
accountability index and the indicator of vertical accountability, whereas the correlation with 
diagonal and horizontal accountability is weaker. The FH Electoral Process correlates even 
stronger with vertical accountability and less with horizontal and diagonal accountability. Finally, 
the FH Freedom of the Press indicator correlates the strongest with diagonal accountability, 
which includes our measures of media freedom.  
Table 2: Correlation of our Accountability Indices with Existing Indices 
 Accountabili
ty 
Vertical 
Accountabili
ty 
Horizontal 
Accountabili
ty 
Diagonal 
Accountabilit
y 
WGI Voice and 
Accountability 
0.9206 0.8712 0.8440 0.8738 
FH Political Rights  -0.8656 -0.8495 -0.7699 -0.8377 
FH Electoral Process  0.8636 0.8690 0.7473 0.8286 
FH Freedom of the Press  -0.8598 -0.8013 -0.7560 -0.8353 
 
Note: For the Freedom House indices Political Rights and Freedom of the Press higher values indicate less 
freedom. Therefore the correlation is negative. The WGI Voice and Accountability covers 1996-2014, the FH 
Political Rights 1972-2014, the FH Electoral Process 2005-2015 and the FH Freedom of the Press 1993-
2014. 
 
Overall, our measures correlate highly with existing indicators that cover similar 
concepts. In particular, the sub-indices that are the conceptually the most related to an existing 
index correlate the strongest. This enhances our confidence in the reliability of our indices.    
Next, we present line graphs for three sample countries from 1900 to 2014 to illustrate 
the differences between the indices. Furthermore, the trends outlined in the figures reflect the 
history of the countries, which supports the face validity of our measures. 
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Figure 7 illustrates our accountability indices for Spain.  All indices have extremely low 
scores during the authoritarian regime established by Franco. Some opening of the space for 
vertical accountability is shown in 1967 when the first elections are held. With the 
democratization of Spain in the late 1970s, the scores for all accountability indices rise 
significantly. Notably, the scores for horizontal accountability are somewhat lower, indicating 
that in Spain the extent to which the legislature, the judiciary and other oversight agencies hold 
the executive to account could be expanded. 
Figure 7: Development of accountability indices in Spain 
 
 
 
Finally, looking at Figure 9 for Uganda, the data indicates greatest repression in terms of 
horizontal and diagonal accountability during Idi Amin’s military dictatorship (1971-79). In the 
decades after there is an upward trend across all indices apart from vertical accountability, which 
spikes down due to the coup in 1985 until parliamentary elections take place in 1989. 
Nevertheless the space for accountability remains quite limited. Particularly, vertical 
accountability shows the low scores compared to the other indices. Starting from 2006 the space 
for civil society organizations and the media to hold the government to account is restricted 
even further as the decline in the diagonal accountability index illustrates. 
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Figure 9: Development of accountability indices in Uganda 
 
 
Part 3: Empirical Application: Is Accountability 
Developmental?   
Demonstrating theoretically-expected effects in regression analysis is a key method to validate 
indices (Schmotz 2015). Based on prior research, we expect human development to improve as a 
government becomes more accountable (Gerring et al 2012, World Bank Institute 2005, Miller 
2015). Therefore, we explore how our accountability indices are related to key human 
development outcomes such as health and education.  
More specifically, researchers have argued that the accountability mechanisms in 
democratic regimes enhance human development (Adam et al., 2011; Biser et al., 2012; Harding 
et al., 2010; Gerring et al., 2012).  In particular, vertical accountability gives politicians incentives 
to promote policies that are in interest of a wider group of citizens in order to excel at the next 
election (Adserà et al 2003, Miller 2015, Norris 2012, Besley and Kudamatsu 2006, Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003). Since we assume that human development is in the interest of a large 
group of citizens, effective vertical accountability should increase pressure for effective public 
policies in this area and therefore improve human welfare. This establishes a mechanism that 
induces accountability based on incentives for leaders who want to gain and keep power by 
meeting citizens’ demands (Skaaning 2015, p. 5).  However, the causal mechanism for holding 
politicians accountable for their actions works in practice better if citizens receive reliable and 
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impartial information about the government performance (Adserà et al 2013). By empowering 
citizens and actively involving them in the monitoring of government performance, diagonal 
accountability mechanisms can enhance government transparency and exert sanction power via 
“naming and shaming”, thus potentially serving as powerful tools to ensure that government 
agencies serve the interest of the people in a better way (World Bank 2005: 7). We therefore also 
expect diagonal accountability to have a positive relationship to development outcomes. Finally, 
horizontal checks between institutions prevent abuse of power by demanding information, 
questioning officials and possibly, punishing improper behavior (Rose-Ackerman 1996; 
O’Donnel 1998). We therefore expect that horizontal accountability will also enhance human 
development.  
 
3.1 Data and Research Strategy  
In the following, we test these arguments using a data set adapted from Miller (2015). Miller 
(2015) has shown that democracies achieve better development outcomes than autocracies and 
that even in the authoritarian regime spectrum countries with elections perform better. Miller 
relies on categorical indicators of regime type in order to essentially proxy the effects of 
accountability. Our continuous indices allow both to 1) model the effects of accountability 
directly and 2) to provide nuanced assessments of the effects of gradual improvements of 
accountability. Therefore, this analysis serves two aims. First, we expect to provide similar 
findings as Miller – in the sense of a positive relationship between accountability and human 
development, which will enhances the confidence in our measures. Second, we will demonstrate 
the added value of our indices by departing from coarse regime categories to a more gradual 
assessment.  
Therefore, we follow Miller’s (2015) choice of variables for the empirical analysis. As 
dependent variables, we use the following proxies for human development:  infant mortality (per 
1,000 live births), child mortality under the age of 5 (per 1,000 live births), life expectancy, 
literacy and school enrollment (the percentage of age-appropriate children enrolled in primary 
and secondary education).6 Mirroring Miller (2015, p.1542), the models include a set of control 
variables that is common in the literature. First, we add the regional average for each outcome 
variable to account for the specific regional characteristics, as well as certain shock events 
particular for that region and time that could affect our outcome variables. Second, we include a 
                                                
6 Miller has taken the data these variables from World Bank (2011). 
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measure for foreign aid, whether the country is a communist state, and a control for Political 
Violence (a 0-10 rating of domestic civil and ethnic violence. Third, four variables account for 
the economic situation in a country as the amount of economic resources available to the 
government and the distribution of income directly affect any aspect of human development 
(logged Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, Economic Growth, Resource Dependence 
(fuel and metal revenues as a percentage of GDP), Economic Inequality (Gini coefficient). 
Fourth, two variables on socioeconomic characteristics are included to account for the ease of 
delivering public services: Population and Urbanization (the percentage living in cities of 
100,000+).  We also add a dichotomous indicator of electoral regimes (i.e. did the regime hold 
elections, which goes to 0 if elected bodies are removed from office due to a coup, war or 
similar events) in order to account for the argument that elections in their own right are 
associated with better human development outcomes.   
 
3.2 Empirical Results  
For each of the five development outcomes as dependent variable we run ordinary least squares 
(OLS) with year fixed effects to account for variation across time and country fixed effects to 
account for country-level omitted variables. Table 3 reports the results of the OLS regression 
predicting infant mortality and main results for the other outcome variables are displayed in the 
Appendix on Table A2-6. Models 1, 2 and 3 test the effect of vertical, horizontal and diagonal 
accountability separately. As expected, all three indices correlate negatively at a statistically 
significant level with infant mortality.  
Model 4 includes the three sub-types of accountability together into one model. Out of 
the three, diagonal accountability loses its statistical significance, whereas vertical and horizontal 
continue to show statistically significant negative effects on infant mortality. Given that these 
measures are highly correlated, such a weakening of some results is expected. Model 5 tests the 
relationship between the overall accountability measure and infant mortality. It shows that 
improvements in overall accountability correlate with lower infant mortality. Infant mortality is 
predicted to decrease from an average of 65 deaths per 1000 live births at the lower end of the 
accountability spectrum to an average of about 50 deaths per 1000 live births at the higher end 
of the spectrum (Figure 7).  
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Figure 7: Predicted Margins Infant Mortality (Model 5 - Accountability) 
 
 Note: Dashed lines give 95%- confidence intervals.  
The results for the control variables included in the models reflect Miller (2015) findings. 
However, holding elections, as captured by the electoral regime variable, is associated with 
higher mortality rates, and this relationship is statistically significant.  
 
50
55
60
65
70
Lin
ea
r P
re
dic
tio
n
-2 -1 0 1 2
Accountability
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
De
ns
ity
 27 
Table 3: OLS regression with Infant Mortality as Outcome. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Vertical accountability -7.042***   -5.496***  
 (0.522)   (0.850)  
Horizontal accountability  -3.705***  -1.664***  
  (0.299)  (0.538)  
Diagonal accountability   -3.670*** 0.306  
   (0.315) (0.594)  
Accountability 
 
    -4.216*** 
(0.319) 
Foreign aid -0.0529* -0.0567* -0.0533* -0.0495 -0.0500 
 (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0309) (0.0306) (0.0307) 
GDP/capita (ln) -10.52*** -10.53*** -10.53*** -10.60*** -10.50*** 
 (0.770) (0.772) (0.774) (0.769) (0.770) 
Economic growth 0.0339 0.0361 0.0342 0.0337 0.0339 
 (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0233) (0.0234) 
Resource dependence 0.0371* 0.0428** 0.0462** 0.0379* 0.0444** 
 (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0215) 
Economic inequality -0.0377 -0.0626** -0.0720** -0.0387 -0.0627** 
 (0.0306) (0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0304) 
Population (ln) -19.60*** -19.15*** -17.84*** -19.71*** -18.30*** 
 (1.580) (1.580) (1.590) (1.599) (1.579) 
Urbanization -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.135*** -0.114*** -0.121*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0279) 
Political violence 0.373*** 0.351*** 0.283** 0.360*** 0.307** 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.129) (0.128) (0.127) 
Communist 2.105 1.934 1.127 1.299 1.324 
 (1.516) (1.539) (1.575) (1.574) (1.541) 
Infant mortality, regional average 0.645*** 0.642*** 0.658*** 0.645*** 0.649*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0198) 
Electoral regime 7.671***   6.530***  
 (0.867)   (1.060)  
      
Constant 285.4*** 287.1*** 275.2*** 287.4*** 279.5*** 
 (17.90) (17.95) (18.04) (17.99) (17.92) 
R-squared 0.817 0.815 0.814 0.817 0.816 
Adjusted R-squared 0.808 0.806 0.805 0.808 0.807 
 
OLS regressions; fixed country and year effects; time coverage: 1961 – 2006; 147 countries; 4, 
355 observations; standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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In the Appendix we display the summary results for the regressions for the other 
four outcome variables. These models mirror the ones from Table 3, where Models 1-3 
explore the effect of vertical, horizontal and diagonal accountability separately on the 
outcome variables and Model 4 adds the sub-types of accountability into one model; and 
finally, Model 5 tests the effect of the composite measure of overall accountability in a 
country on the outcome variables. Furthermore, scholars have single-out corruption as 
an explanation for lacking human development (Diamond, 2007; Holmberg & Rothstein, 
2010; Lewis, 2006; Rothstein, 2011). Therefore, in Table A.6 we also report the results of 
regression analysis when including corruption in a state (v2x_corr) as confounder and the 
results do not change substantially. 
In sum, our empirical analysis suggests that all three sub-types of accountability 
and the composite accountability index are strongly associated with better development 
outcomes: Higher levels of accountability and its sub-types tends to be correlated with 
higher life expectancy, literacy, school enrollment and lower mortality of children under 
the age of five. This is in-line with prior findings in the literature and supports the 
validity of our measures. Furthermore, our indices open new avenues to assess the role 
of accountability for human development in a more nuances way.  
 
Conclusion 
Accountable institutions have long been viewed as key to effective and good governance. 
However, researchers and policy-makers lack cross-national measures capturing the core 
dimensions of government accountability over long time periods and for most countries 
of the world. This article refines the concept of accountability and its core dimensions, 
and offers a novel way to operationalize and measure it.  
Based on V-Dem data, we develop four new indices of accountability and its sub-
types for virtually all countries spanning from 1900 until today. Our main accountability 
index captures the extent to which citizens, legislatures, judges, civil society and media 
are able to de-facto oversee and constrain the government. Sub-indices focus on 
individual actor groups – voters and political parties (vertical accountability), legislatures, 
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judiciary and other oversight institutions (horizontal accountability) and civil society and 
media (diagonal accountability).  
Our indices of accountability closely reflect our conceptual notion as we 
demonstrate in empirical analysis. In line with earlier research, our indices show a 
positive relationship to human development, which further points to the importance of 
accountability and the validity of our indices. The indices will allow researchers and 
policy makers alike to gain a better understanding of the state, the historical development 
and the effects of accountability and its sub-types. In particular, we envision that our 
indices will allow scholars to shed more light on the specific effects different types of 
accountability. Furthermore, our indices enable new insights on the pathways to more 
accountable governments. 
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Appendix  
Table A.1. Indicators part of Vertical accountability 
Indicator Question text Answer categories 
Elected 
executive 
(HoEel) 
Is the chief executive (Head of 
State or Head of Government) 
directly elected in multi-party 
elections, or by directly elected 
parliament? 
0: No. 1. HOS and HOG have relative equal 
power, and only one of them is elected. 2: Yes. 
Percent 
Suffrage 
(v2elsuffrage) 
What percentage (%) of adult 
citizens (as defined by statute) has 
the legal right 
to vote in national elections? 
Percent. 
Electoral 
regime index 
(v2x_elecreg) 
At this time, are regularly 
scheduled national elections on 
course, as stipulated 
by election law or well-established 
precedent? 
0: No. 1: Yes. 
Clean elections 
EMB 
autonomy 
(v2elembaut) 
Does the Election Management 
Body (EMB) have autonomy 
from government 
to apply election laws and 
administrative rules impartially in 
national elections? 
0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent 
government, the military, or other de facto 
ruling body. 
1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on 
some issues but on critical issues that influence 
the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to 
the de facto ruling body. 
2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy 
but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent 
this influences the outcome of the election. 
3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts 
impartially almost all the time. It may be 
influenced by the de facto ruling body in some 
minor ways that do not influence the outcome 
of elections. 
4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially 
applies elections laws and administrative rules. 
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EMB 
capacity 
(v2elembcap) 
Does the Election Management 
Body (EMB) have sufficient staff 
and resources 
to administer a well-run national 
election? 
0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, 
financial, or other resources affecting the 
organization across the territory. 
1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they 
nonetheless seriously compromised the 
organization of administratively well-run 
elections in many parts of the country. 
2: Ambiguous. There might be serious 
deficiencies compromising the organization of 
the election but it could also be a product of 
human errors and co-incidence or other factors 
outside the control of the EMB. 
3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources 
but these are neither serious nor widespread. 
4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other 
resources to administer a well-run election. 
Election 
voter registry 
(v2elrgstry) 
In this national election, was there 
a reasonably accurate voter 
registry in placeand was it used? 
0: No. There was no registry, or the registry was 
not used.1: No. There was a registry but it was 
fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of 
eligible voters could have been disenfranchised 
or the outcome could have been affected 
significantly by double-voting and 
impersonation).2: Uncertain. There was a 
registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws 
in the registry had much impact on electoral 
outcomes.3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was 
imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters 
may have been disenfranchised, and double-
voting and impersonation could not have 
affected the results significantly.4: Yes. The 
voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 
1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it 
was applied in a reasonable fashion. 
 35 
Election 
other voting 
irregularities 
(v2elirreg) 
In this national election, was there 
evidence of other intentional 
irregularities by 
incumbent and/or opposition 
parties, and/or vote fraud? 
0: Yes. There were systematic and almost 
nationwide other irregularities. 
1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but 
rather common other irregularities, 
even if only in some parts of the country. 
2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of 
sporadic other irregularities, and it is 
not clear whether they were intentional or 
disfavored particular groups. 
3: Almost none. There were only a limited 
number of irregularities, and many were 
probably unintentional or did not disfavor 
particular groups' access to participation.                                                                                                    
4: None. There was no evidence of intentional 
other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities 
resulting from human error and/or natural 
conditions may still have occurred. 
Election 
government 
intimidation 
(v2elintim) 
In this national election, were 
opposition 
candidates/parties/campaign 
workers subjected to repression, 
intimidation, violence, or 
harassment by the government, 
the ruling party, or their agents? 
0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the 
government or its agents was so strong that the 
entire period was quiet. 
1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent 
and violent harassment and intimidation of the 
opposition by the government or its agents 
during the election period. 
2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not 
systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated – 
harassment and intimidation of the opposition 
by the government or its agents. 3: Restrained. 
There were sporadic instances of violent 
harassment and intimidation 
by the government or its agents, in at least one 
part of the country, and directed 
at only one or two local branches of opposition 
groups. 
4: None. There was no harassment or 
intimidation of opposition by the government or 
its agents, during the election campaign period 
and polling day. 
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Election free 
and fair 
(v2elfrfair) 
Taking all aspects of the pre-
election period, election day, and 
the post-electionprocess into 
account, would you consider this 
national election to be free and 
fair? 
0: No, not at all. The elections were 
fundamentally flawed and the official results had 
little if anything to do with the 'will of the 
people' (i.e., who became president; or who won 
the legislative majority). 
1: Not really. While the elections allowed for 
some competition, the irregularities in the end 
affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who 
became president; or who won the legislative 
majority). 
2: Ambiguous. There was substantial 
competition and freedom of participation but 
there were also significant irregularities. It is 
hard to determine whether the irregularities 
affected the outcome or not (as defined above). 
3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and 
some degree of fraud and irregularities but these 
did not in the end affect the outcome (as 
defined above). 
4: Yes. There was some amount of human error 
and logistical restrictions but these were largely 
unintentional and without significant 
consequences. 
Elections 
multiparty 
(v2elmulpar) 
Was this national election 
multiparty? 
0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no 
meaningful competition (includes situations 
where a few parties are legal but they are all de 
facto controlled by the dominant party). 
1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined 
as above) but multiple candidates from the same 
party and/or independents contest legislative 
seats or the presidency. 
2: Constrained. At least one real opposition 
party is allowed to contest but competition is 
highly constrained – legally or informally. 
3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle 
but either one main opposition party is 
prevented (de jure or de facto) from contesting, 
or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding 
natural disasters) prevent competition in a 
portion of the 
territory. 
4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a 
few marginal parties may not be permitted to 
contest (e.g. far-right/left extremist parties, anti-
democratic religious or ethnic parties). 
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Political parties 
Party ban 
(v2psparban) 
Are any parties banned?  0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored 
party (and closely allied parties) are banned. 
1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are 
no officially recognized parties. 2: Yes. Many 
parties are banned. 
3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned. 
4: No. No parties are officially banned. 
Barriers to 
parties 
(v2psbars) 
How restrictive are the barriers to 
forming a party? 
0: Parties are not allowed. 
1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for 
parties not affiliated with the government to 
form (legally). 
2: There are significant obstacles (e.g. party 
leaders face high levels of regular political 
harassment by authorities). 
3: There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders 
face occasional political harassment by 
authorities). 
4: There are no substantial barriers. 
Opposition 
parties 
autonomy 
(v2psoppaut) 
Are opposition parties 
independent and autonomous of 
the ruling regime? 
0: Opposition parties are not allowed.1: There 
are no autonomous, independent opposition 
parties. Opposition parties areeither selected or 
co-opted by the ruling regime.2: At least some 
opposition parties are autonomous and 
independent of the rulingregime.3: Most 
significant opposition parties are autonomous 
and independent of the rulingregime.4: All 
opposition parties are autonomous and 
independent of the ruling regime. 
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Table A.2. Indicators part of Horizontal accountability 
Indicator Question text Answer categories 
Executive 
oversight 
(v2lgotovst) 
If executive branch officials 
were engaged in 
unconstitutional, illegal, or 
unethical activity, how likely is it 
that a body other than the 
legislature, such as a comptroller 
general, general prosecutor, or 
ombudsman, would question or 
investigate them and issue an 
unfavorable decision or report? 
0: Extremely unlikely.       1: Unlikely. 
2: As likely as not. 
3: Likely. 
4: Certain or nearly certain. 
Judiciary   
Executive 
respects 
constitution 
(v2exrescon) 
Do members of the executive 
(the head of state, the head of 
government, and 
cabinet ministers) respect the 
constitution? 
0: Members of the executive violate the 
constitution whenever they want to, without 
legal consequences. 
1: Members of the executive violate most 
provisions of the constitution without legal 
consequences, but still must respect certain 
provisions. 
2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3).  
3: Members of the executive rarely violate the 
constitution, and when it happens they face 
legal charges. 
4: Members of the executive never violate the 
constitution. 
Compliance 
with judiciary 
(v2jucomp) 
How often would you say the 
government complies with 
important decisions by 
other courts with which it 
disagrees? 
0: Never. 
1: Seldom. 
2: About half of the time. 3: Usually. 
4: Always. 
Compliance 
with high 
court 
(v2juhccomp) 
How often would you say the 
government complies with 
important decisions of 
the high court with which it 
disagrees? 
0: Never. 
1: Seldom. 
2: About half of the time. 3: Usually. 
4: Always. 
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High court 
independence 
(v2juhcind) 
When the high court in the 
judicial system is ruling in cases 
that are salient to the 
government, how often would 
you say that it makes decisions 
that merely reflect government 
wishes regardless of its sincere 
view of the legal record? 
0: Always. 
1: Usually. 
2: About half of the time. 3: Seldom. 
4: Never. 
Legislature 
Lower court 
independence 
(v2juncind) 
When judges not on the high 
court are ruling in cases that are 
salient to the government, how 
often would you say that their 
decisions merely reflect 
government wishes regardless of 
their sincere view of the legal 
record? 
0: Always. 
1: Usually. 
2: About half of the time. 3: Seldom. 
4: Never. 
Legislature 
questions 
officials in 
practice 
(v2lgqstexp) 
In practice, does the legislature 
routinely question executive 
branch officials? 
0: No - never or very rarely.      
1: Yes - routinely. 
Legislature 
investigates in 
practice 
(v2lginvstp) 
If the executive were engaged in 
unconstitutional, illegal, or 
unethical activity, how likely is it 
that a legislative body (perhaps a 
whole chamber, perhaps a 
committee, whether aligned with 
government or opposition) 
would conduct an investigation 
that would result in a decision or 
report that is unfavorable to the 
executive? 
0: Extremely unlikely.        
1: Unlikely. 
2: As likely as not. 
3: Likely. 
4: Certain or nearly certain. 
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Table A.3. Indicators part of Diagonal accountability 
 
Indicator 
Question text Answer categories 
Engaged 
society 
(v2dlengage) 
When important policy changes are 
being considered, how wide and 
how 
independent are public 
deliberations? 
0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never 
allowed. 
1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but 
the public below the elite levels is almost always 
either unaware of major policy debates or unable to 
take part in them. 
2: Public deliberation is not repressed but 
nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are 
typically controlled and/or constrained by the 
elites. 
3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and 
some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but 
it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups 
that tends to be the same across issue-areas. 
4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a 
relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often 
participate and vary with different issue-areas. 
5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as 
ordinary people tend to discuss major policies 
among themselves, in the media, in associations or 
neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots 
deliberation is common and unconstrained. 
Civil society 
CSO entry 
and exit 
(v2cseeorgs) 
To what extent does the 
government achieve control over 
entry and exit by civil 
society organizations (CSOs) into 
public life? 
0: Monopolistic control.  
1: Substantial control.  
2: Moderate control.  
3: Minimal control.  
4: Unconstrained.  
      
CSO 
repression 
(v2csreprss) 
Does the government attempt to 
repress civil society organizations 
(CSOs)? 
0:Severely.  
1:Substantially. 
2:Moderately. 
3:Weakly.  
4: No. 
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CSO 
participatory 
environment 
(v2csprtcpt) 
Which of these best describes the 
involvement of people in civil 
society 
organizations (CSOs)? 
0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and 
although a large number of people may be 
active in them, their participation is not purely 
voluntary. 
1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are 
active in them. 
2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular 
involvement is minimal. 
3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is 
considered normal for people to be at least 
occasionally active in at least one of them. 
Media freedom 
Media bias 
(v2mebias) 
Is there media bias against 
opposition parties or candidates? 
0: The print and broadcast media cover only 
the official party or candidates, or have no 
political coverage, or there are no opposition 
parties or candidates to cover. 
1: The print and broadcast media cover more 
than just the official party or candidates but all 
the opposition parties or candidates receive 
only negative coverage. 
2: The print and broadcast media cover some 
opposition parties or candidates more or less 
impartially, but they give only negative or no 
coverage to at least one newsworthy party or 
candidate. 
3: The print and broadcast media cover 
opposition parties or candidates more or less 
impartially, but they give an exaggerated 
amount of coverage to the governing party or 
candidates. 
4: The print and broadcast media cover all 
newsworthy parties and candidates more or less 
impartially and in proportion to their 
newsworthiness. 
Print/broad
cast media 
critical 
(v2mecrit) 
Of the major print and broadcast 
outlets, how many routinely 
criticize the 
government? 
0: None. 1: Only a few marginal outlets. 
2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the 
government but there are other 
important outlets that never do. 
3: All major media outlets criticize the 
government at least occasionally. 
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Print/broad
cast media 
perspectives 
(v2merange) 
Do the major print and broadcast 
media represent a wide range of 
political 
perspectives? 
0: The major media represent only the 
government's perspective. 
1: The major media represent only the 
perspectives of the government and a 
government-approved, semi-official opposition 
party. 
2: The major media represent a variety of 
political perspectives but they systematically 
ignore at least one political perspective that is 
important in this society. 
3: All perspectives that are important in this 
society are represented in at least one of the 
major media. 
Government 
censorship 
effort - 
Media 
(v2mecenef
m) 
Does the government directly or 
indirectly attempt to censor the 
print or 
broadcast media? 
0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine. 
1: Attempts to censor are indirect but 
nevertheless routine. 
2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to 
especially sensitive issues. 
3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited 
to especially sensitive issues. 
4: The government rarely attempts to censor 
major media in any way, and when 
such exceptional attempts are discovered, the 
responsible officials are usually punished. 
Harassment 
of journalists 
(v2meharjrn) 
Are individual journalists harassed - 
i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, 
imprisoned, beaten, or killed -- by 
governmental or powerful 
nongovernmental actors while 
engaged in legitimate journalistic 
activities? 
0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic 
activities that would offend powerful actors 
because harassment or worse would be certain 
to occur. 
1: Some journalists occasionally offend 
powerful actors but they are almost always 
harassed or worse and eventually are forced to 
stop. 
2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors 
are forced to stop but others manage to 
continue practicing journalism freely for long 
periods of time. 
3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for 
offending powerful actors, and if this were to 
happen, those responsible for the harassment 
would be identified and punished. 
4: Journalists are never harassed by 
governmental or powerful nongovernmental 
actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic 
activities. 
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Media self-
censorship 
(v2meslfcen) 
Is there self-censorship among 
journalists when reporting on 
issues that the 
government considers politically 
sensitive? 
0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough. 
1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete. 
2: There is self-censorship on a few highly 
sensitive political issues but not on 
moderately sensitive issues. 
3: There is little or no self-censorship among 
journalists. 
Internet 
censorship 
(v2mecenefi) 
Does the government attempt to 
censor information (text, audio, or 
visuals) on 
the Internet? 
0: This country has no Internet access at all. 
[This value is excluded from datasets. Values of 
0 are set to missing before this variable is 
estimated by the measurement model so that 
the remaining 1-4 values form an ordinal scale.] 
1: The government successfully blocks Internet 
access except to sites that are pro- government 
or devoid of political content. 
2: The government attempts to block Internet 
access except to sites that are pro- government 
or devoid of political content, but many users 
are able to circumvent such controls. 
3: The government allows Internet access, 
including to some sites that are critical of the 
government, but blocks selected sites that deal 
with especially politically sensitive issues. 
4: The government allows Internet access that 
is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned 
above. 
Freedom of discussion and expression 
Freedom of 
discussion 
for men 
(v2cldiscm) 
Are men able to openly discuss 
political issues in private homes 
and in public 
spaces? 
0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of 
expression exists for men. Men are subject to 
immediate and harsh intervention and 
harassment for expression of political opinion. 
1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political 
opinions by men are frequently exposed to 
intervention and harassment. 
2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political 
opinions by men are occasionally exposed to 
intervention and harassment. 
3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints 
on the freedom of expression in the private 
sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated 
cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a 
rule there is no intervention or harassment if 
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men make political statements. 
4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men 
in their homes and in public spaces is not 
restricted. 
Freedom of 
discussion 
for 
women(v2cl
discw) 
Are women able to openly discuss 
political issues in private homes 
and in public 
spaces? 
0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of 
expression exists for women. Women are 
subject to immediate and harsh intervention 
and harassment for expression of political 
opinion. 
1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political 
opinions by women are frequently exposed to 
intervention and harassment. 
2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political 
opinions by women are occasionally exposed to 
intervention and harassment. 
3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints 
on the freedom of expression in the private 
sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated 
cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a 
rule there is no intervention or harassment if 
women make political statements. 
4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by 
women in their homes and in public spaces is 
not restricted. 
Freedom of 
academic 
and cultural 
expression 
(v2clacfree) 
Is there academic freedom and 
freedom of cultural expression 
related to 
political issues? 
0: Not respected by public authorities. 
Censorship and intimidation are frequent. 
Academic activities and cultural expressions are 
severely restricted or controlled by the 
government. 
1: Weakly respected by public authorities. 
Academic freedom and freedom of cultural 
expression are practiced occasionally, but direct 
criticism of the government is mostly met with 
repression. 
2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. 
Academic freedom and freedom of cultural 
expression are practiced routinely, but strong 
criticism of the government is sometimes met 
with repression. 
3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There 
are few limitations on academic freedom and 
freedom of cultural expression, and resulting 
sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft. 
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4: Fully respected by public authorities. There 
are no restrictions on academic freedom or 
cultural expression. 
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Figure A.1: Vertical and Diagonal Accountability in 2012 
 
Note: Red line gives global average of index in 2012. 
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Figure A.2: Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability in 2012 
 
Note: Red line gives global average of index in 2012. 
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Table A.1: Accountability Ratings in 2012  
  Accountability Vertical Horizontal Diagonal 
United Kingdom 2.256719 1.983383 1.930028 2.165875 
France 2.205386 1.977112 1.667692 2.264556 
United States 2.159707 1.813332 1.88149 2.18718 
Germany 2.149646 1.971375 2.342532 1.706282 
Denmark 2.103737 1.652441 2.299462 2.084181 
Norway 2.076946 1.645922 2.28206 2.016071 
Switzerland 2.05035 1.67739 1.906238 2.124782 
Finland 2.01688 1.636873 2.233441 1.909486 
Estonia 2.007001 1.709972 1.903967 1.977809 
Sweden 2.005106 1.673535 2.030601 1.931355 
Costa Rica 1.965592 1.645405 1.730271 2.010357 
Portugal 1.909099 1.820445 1.432795 1.839545 
Chile 1.894907 1.801976 1.577295 1.715747 
Australia 1.89254 1.802955 1.525148 1.700055 
Netherlands 1.881817 1.699696 1.726525 1.712734 
Uruguay 1.850401 1.711356 1.20835 1.927668 
Poland 1.834624 1.66162 1.571338 1.710001 
Belgium 1.819792 1.622798 1.578915 1.791832 
Spain 1.78597 1.680806 1.089166 1.890557 
Czech Republic 1.784716 1.592806 1.447862 1.763453 
New Zealand 1.782606 1.588947 1.744785 1.608272 
Brazil 1.766413 1.622661 1.239803 1.749839 
Latvia 1.763743 1.55754 1.377794 1.834917 
Austria 1.751645 1.490415 1.587071 1.793077 
Canada 1.744595 1.574738 1.601135 1.569694 
Lithuania 1.728626 1.376222 1.939051 1.64268 
Ireland 1.727181 1.59607 1.240137 1.802915 
Slovenia 1.719734 1.501125 1.648893 1.638012 
Greece 1.676579 1.365015 1.41779 1.864789 
Japan 1.650978 1.519176 1.634001 1.42683 
Iceland 1.615632 1.542182 1.195928 1.617966 
Slovakia 1.613563 1.571984 1.230283 1.456984 
Italy 1.588618 1.440006 1.129588 1.702428 
Mauritius 1.583969 1.457965 1.618542 1.30619 
Cape Verde 1.475654 1.256156 1.219629 1.581674 
Croatia 1.452995 1.432513 .9783483 1.402884 
Israel 1.443706 1.406877 1.7165 .9605066 
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Taiwan 1.432183 1.307481 .9587735 1.555222 
Suriname 1.417588 1.286299 1.241109 1.392451 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.414144 1.307667 1.060154 1.467281 
South Africa 1.41219 1.185623 1.107592 1.609615 
Mongolia 1.394019 1.165878 1.264949 1.485339 
Jamaica 1.379249 1.375323 .8195664 1.398984 
Korea, South 1.364614 1.322885 1.265425 1.153607 
Ghana 1.351372 1.121259 .9648499 1.591345 
Cyprus 1.350069 1.055479 1.196355 1.639911 
Barbados 1.33962 1.156176 1.336314 1.349469 
Panama 1.303756 1.211918 .8963057 1.326173 
Argentina 1.291681 1.24687 .5896984 1.503918 
India 1.263034 1.144262 1.246545 1.106361 
Peru 1.254746 1.365033 .925853 .9610239 
Bulgaria 1.208061 1.011446 1.337786 1.134189 
Hungary 1.180781 1.244326 .859391 .9929111 
Moldova 1.173798 .9859954 1.309978 1.106142 
Philippines 1.134709 .7151128 1.160816 1.489777 
Botswana 1.121686 1.093657 .8162767 1.17902 
Senegal 1.11066 1.136618 .4522361 1.274483 
Liberia 1.109064 .7960982 .8761973 1.517278 
Niger 1.08875 1.088775 .7902133 1.05198 
Indonesia 1.077613 1.048169 .5667545 1.185915 
Romania 1.06282 .87507 .6931194 1.386796 
Vanuatu 1.05968 .7500737 .6140817 1.583424 
Albania 1.056621 .7016287 1.227061 1.261332 
Sao Tome and Principe 1.046568 1.115873 .9583482 .8597239 
Colombia 1.037709 .832157 1.090493 1.037577 
Mali 1.016986 .8946864 .4977945 1.329006 
Serbia .9978588 1.003014 .6552965 1.02508 
Benin .9941922 .7638472 .5385865 1.39274 
Mexico .9833013 1.000008 .6044188 .9739489 
Dominican Republic .9758316 .9140632 -.0428796 1.529554 
El Salvador .9685434 .8662312 .4069796 1.24401 
Bosnia and Herzegovina .9664104 .9738635 .3621077 1.154269 
Lesotho .9413638 1.101798 .6286752 .8084049 
Nepal .9366262 .6137849 .912799 1.215202 
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Thailand .9225168 .8930007 .8663402 .7934682 
Bolivia .917517 .9424518 .3262235 1.05438 
Solomon Islands .9019089 .794479 .6260801 1.083322 
Georgia .8968034 .9263522 .5096246 .9937654 
Paraguay .8787293 .9148239 .490151 .8948128 
Zambia .849508 .7420493 .8879574 .8676477 
East Timor .8494895 .880778 .4095792 .9811881 
Maldives .846177 .7610122 1.016142 .7932304 
Libya .8114861 .8116474 .7584879 .7004821 
Namibia .7937923 .7321095 .3293813 1.072944 
Kenya .7895644 .2892986 1.140067 1.198293 
Sierra Leone .7843323 .6559599 .2268475 1.273682 
Tanzania .7712532 .5931983 1.031544 .8251649 
Montenegro .7619107 .6545026 .7337776 .8747467 
Bhutan .7540334 .8823258 .849415 .4142169 
Turkey .7481744 1.020129 .4545811 .4508386 
Lebanon .7265971 .6699591 .1227084 1.132609 
Malawi .7259338 .7980219 .4455167 .6855249 
Nigeria .7105715 .5137636 .4872458 1.109071 
Papua New Guinea .6998324 .4328994 .8773781 .9699246 
Pakistan .698709 .6346892 .4825584 .8515686 
Iraq .6901807 .659158 .7538412 .656235 
Guatemala .6666402 .6414091 .4165136 .7796012 
Comoros .6496317 .8673068 .1132467 .6115815 
Kosovo .6432922 .5848332 .4890528 .7425785 
Ecuador .6326891 1.001244 -.2796699 .6296235 
Kyrgyzstan .6191225 .5708647 .7004138 .6248592 
Macedonia .6141759 .6759813 .3473171 .6471739 
Honduras .613443 .6636538 .2902194 .6804669 
Ivory Coast .6022954 .5799782 .0734754 .9629326 
Morocco .6010362 .7283337 .3520933 .5518447 
Guyana .5994015 .8631864 -.4532099 .7946123 
Somaliland .555912 .6484241 .2396215 .609805 
Burkina Faso .5392075 .6643335 -.39976 .912518 
Ukraine .4879106 .5297371 .2167405 .6130166 
Uganda .4713447 .2758242 .9090964 .5050273 
Togo .4695655 .4943479 -.0372851 .7738894 
Mauritania .4491804 .7272083 -.7504839 .8201423 
Seychelles .4457958 .5782098 .2187697 .4709575 
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Sri Lanka .4167575 .652256 -.0745687 .4044311 
Bangladesh .3980929 .6081384 -.109567 .4602002 
Haiti .3850971 .3563892 .1424936 .6368608 
Nicaragua .3800928 .4963594 -.0783772 .5377845 
Mozambique .3749985 .5048084 .0071568 .4817724 
Afghanistan .3483813 .2569441 .3853396 .5196213 
Gabon .3174373 .3244172 -.4203949 .8336171 
Egypt .316803 .4856493 .143876 .2902603 
Armenia .3086547 .4192041 -.3301623 .6675158 
Yemen .3080069 .3296458 .1583278 .5241848 
Madagascar .2711609 -.6644965 .0106954 .6353177 
Jordan .2365718 .3509743 -.0170271 .410737 
Cameroon .2302906 .1738266 -.1489159 .6810926 
Congo, Democratic Republic 
of 
.2117698 .1879554 .1698327 .3863473 
Guinea-Bissau .1852902 .4311731 -.8559822 .3126581 
Burma/Myanmar .1713521 .419507 -.0631333 .1072071 
Guinea .1538703 -.6825464 -.8350927 .7071195 
Malaysia .1136809 .4153577 -.3279857 .0936365 
Venezuela .1045436 .5087989 -.9279492 .3137486 
Burundi .1041986 .2722109 -.2217376 .2329275 
Somalia .0938098 -.7641887 .3581284 .1601481 
Central African Republic .0801736 .0722635 .0115732 .3592453 
Palestine/West Bank .0216729 -.7151959 -.2651898 .350068 
Iran .0049533 .1854137 .6553085 -.4086827 
Algeria .002067 .3203232 -.4633434 .0560664 
Cambodia -.0068085 .3172324 -.5239765 .0630235 
Russia -.0082632 .3380481 -.4641716 -.0002563 
Rwanda -.058541 .3050322 .080896 -.3847405 
Djibouti -.100187 .1759678 -.8937818 .2487804 
South Sudan -.1544922 -.7511868 -.0707719 -.112256 
Zimbabwe -.1701093 -.1483414 -.149042 -.0323351 
Gambia -.1858844 .3281617 -.6229769 -.4137043 
Congo, Republic of the -.1976249 .1382465 -1.150701 .1197717 
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Angola -.2180768 .1946787 -1.047025 -.060203 
Ethiopia -.2203837 .1378597 -.5562736 -.27321 
Palestine/Gaza -.2293176 -.7434354 -.441998 -.0159841 
Vietnam, Democratic 
Republic of 
-.2572227 .1181057 -.0717237 -.3882079 
Kazakhstan -.2599667 .133565 -.8506579 -.0611205 
Fiji -.3433228 -.7765577 -.9929068 .0020776 
Chad -.3500893 .0205421 -1.138609 -.0841078 
Sudan -.4562148 -.1184495 -.6501495 -.4645475 
Tajikistan -.5493929 -.1154971 -1.101538 -.3446582 
Belarus -.551443 -.0045472 -1.359657 -.4127811 
Azerbaijan -.6035962 -.1034556 -1.19374 -.5162739 
Swaziland -.6892647 -1.49025 -.0039222 -.6320114 
China -.7276527 -1.133348 -.6655288 -.4982739 
Laos -.7970429 -.3131931 -.1235447 -1.149782 
Cuba -.8748889 -.042906 -1.219874 -1.179316 
Uzbekistan -.9604028 -.2364942 -1.144101 -1.193438 
Saudi Arabia -1.011338 -1.543722 -.656721 -.8399763 
Qatar -1.026849 -1.353785 -1.025666 -.7343224 
Syria -1.112128 -.3676028 -.9839083 -1.52629 
Turkmenistan -1.309396 -.3057897 -1.714085 -1.699764 
Korea, North -1.341522 -.3121561 -1.313877 -2.0263 
Eritrea -1.62752 -1.467963 -1.658429 -1.504683 
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Table A.2. Effects of Accountability on Life Expectancy. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Vertical accountability 1.140***   1.755***  
 (0.138)   (0.212)  
Horizontal accountability  0.331***  -0.160  
  (0.0773)  (0.118)  
Diagonal accountability   0.339*** -0.343***  
   (0.0772) (0.128)  
Accountability     0.416*** 
(0.0775) 
Foreign aid -0.0344*** -0.0334*** -0.0341*** -0.0324*** -0.0346*** 
 (0.00704) (0.00710) (0.00711) (0.00705) (0.00710) 
GDP/capita (ln) 0.889*** 0.909*** 0.910*** 0.883*** 0.898*** 
 (0.187) (0.187) (0.187) (0.186) (0.187) 
Economic growth 0.00467 0.00442 0.00448 0.00395 0.00466 
 (0.00556) (0.00560) (0.00560) (0.00555) (0.00559) 
Resource dependence 0.0237*** 0.0223*** 0.0222*** 0.0246*** 0.0222*** 
 (0.00515) (0.00518) (0.00518) (0.00515) (0.00517) 
Economic inequality 0.0283*** 0.0326*** 0.0324*** 0.0263*** 0.0323*** 
 (0.00737) (0.00739) (0.00738) (0.00738) (0.00738) 
Population (ln) 1.890*** 1.986*** 1.871*** 1.968*** 1.845*** 
 (0.339) (0.338) (0.340) (0.340) (0.339) 
Urbanization 0.00744 0.00951 0.00961 0.00662 0.00921 
 (0.00666) (0.00670) (0.00670) (0.00665) (0.00669) 
Political violence -0.279*** -0.287*** -0.276*** -0.297*** -0.273*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0304) (0.0306) (0.0305) (0.0306) 
Communist 1.723*** 1.130*** 1.064*** 1.532*** 1.221*** 
 (0.387) (0.389) (0.383) (0.392) (0.385) 
Life expectancy, regional average 0.820*** 0.810*** 0.816*** 0.813*** 0.817*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0236) (0.0237) 
Electoral regime -1.216***   -1.872***  
 (0.232)   (0.289)  
      
Constant -13.24*** -14.61*** -13.90*** -12.96*** -13.69*** 
 (3.556) (3.563) (3.564) (3.558) (3.560) 
      
Observations 4,431 4,431 4,431 4,431 4,431 
R-squared 0.769 0.766 0.766 0.770 0.767 
Number of countries 146 146 146 146 146 
Adjusted R-squared 0.758 0.755 0.755 0.759 0.755 
OLS regressions; fixed country and year effects; time coverage: 1961 – 2006; standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.3. Effects of Accountability on Literacy. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Vertical accountability 1.515***   1.086***  
 (0.263)   (0.405)  
Horizontal accountability  0.533***  0.0669  
  (0.145)  (0.223)  
Diagonal accountability   0.605*** 0.277  
   (0.145) (0.242)  
Accountability 
 
    0.565*** 
(0.146) 
Foreign aid -0.0270** -0.0287** -0.0305** -0.0287** -0.0300** 
 (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
GDP/capita (ln) 0.295 0.162 0.171 0.296 0.156 
 (0.337) (0.337) (0.337) (0.337) (0.337) 
Economic growth -0.00411 -0.00389 -0.00344 -0.00359 -0.00361 
 (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0110) 
Resource dependence -0.00166 -0.00553 -0.00561 -0.00226 -0.00563 
 (0.00983) (0.00983) (0.00983) (0.00983) (0.00983) 
Economic inequality -0.119*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.118*** -0.111*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0139) 
Population (ln) 18.44*** 18.38*** 18.16*** 18.40*** 18.17*** 
 (0.826) (0.821) (0.825) (0.828) (0.826) 
Urbanization 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
Political violence -0.0877 -0.0694 -0.0487 -0.0740 -0.0540 
 (0.0573) (0.0574) (0.0579) (0.0581) (0.0578) 
Communist 1.145 0.507 0.539 1.264* 0.515 
 (0.720) (0.715) (0.705) (0.730) (0.710) 
Literacy, regional average 0.506*** 0.497*** 0.499*** 0.506*** 0.499*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
Electoral regime -2.726***   -2.270***  
 (0.440)   (0.549)  
Constant -126.7*** -126.3*** -124.8*** -126.6*** -124.7*** 
 (7.635) (7.603) (7.622) (7.645) (7.630) 
Observations 4,454 4,454 4,454 4,454 4,454 
R-squared 0.809 0.808 0.808 0.809 0.808 
Number of countries 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-squared 0.800 0.799 0.799 0.800 0.799 
OLS regressions; fixed country and year effects; time coverage: 1961 – 2006; standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.4. Effects of Accountability on School Enrollment. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Vertical accountability 1.023**   -2.387***  
 (0.431)   (0.649)  
Horizontal accountability  1.444***  0.727**  
  (0.241)  (0.362)  
Diagonal accountability   1.822*** 2.147***  
   (0.243) (0.393)  
Accountability 
 
    1.839*** 
(0.244) 
Foreign aid 0.0528** 0.0497** 0.0450** 0.0432** 0.0451** 
 (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0209) 
GDP/capita (ln) 7.615*** 7.783*** 8.037*** 7.982*** 7.965*** 
 (0.603) (0.601) (0.602) (0.601) (0.601) 
Economic growth -0.0487*** -0.0467*** -0.0468*** -0.0467*** -0.0468*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173) 
Resource dependence -0.0749*** -0.0793*** -0.0817*** -0.0868*** -0.0812*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) 
Economic inequality -0.0626*** -0.0657*** -0.0641*** -0.0539** -0.0646*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0232) 
Population (ln) 9.340*** 9.514*** 9.124*** 8.511*** 9.003*** 
 (1.180) (1.169) (1.169) (1.178) (1.171) 
Urbanization -0.0850*** -0.0790*** -0.0861*** -0.0840*** -0.0855*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0231) 
Political violence -0.190** -0.185** -0.113 -0.0732 -0.122 
 (0.0926) (0.0924) (0.0931) (0.0936) (0.0929) 
Communist 2.461** 3.767*** 3.931*** 3.419*** 4.111*** 
 (1.252) (1.250) (1.230) (1.257) (1.236) 
Schooling, regional average 0.375*** 0.400*** 0.407*** 0.400*** 0.409*** 
 (0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0450) (0.0451) (0.0450) 
Electoral regime 0.199   3.827***  
 (0.724)   (0.886)  
Constant -106.6*** -110.6*** -109.6*** -106.4*** -108.1*** 
 (12.81) (12.71) (12.67) (12.72) (12.68) 
      
Observations 3,703 3,703 3,703 3,703 3,703 
R-squared 0.626 0.627 0.629 0.631 0.629 
Number of countries 144 144 144 144 144 
Adjusted R-squared 0.605 0.607 0.609 0.611 0.609 
OLS regressions; fixed country and year effects; time coverage: 1971 – 2006; standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.5. Effects of Accountability on Under-5 Mortality. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Vertical accountability -10.70***   -8.623***  
 (0.982)   (1.520)  
Horizontal accountability  -5.511***  -1.887**  
  (0.547)  (0.838)  
Diagonal accountability   -5.255*** 0.107  
   (0.548) (0.913)  
Accountability 
 
    -5.900*** 
(0.550) 
Foreign aid 0.0517 0.0533 0.0615 0.0572 0.0662 
 (0.0504) (0.0507) (0.0508) (0.0505) (0.0507) 
GDP/capita (ln) -8.878*** -8.941*** -9.111*** -8.871*** -8.973*** 
 (1.280) (1.284) (1.285) (1.280) (1.282) 
Economic growth -0.0104 -0.0147 -0.0145 -0.0128 -0.0154 
 (0.0395) (0.0397) (0.0397) (0.0395) (0.0396) 
Resource dependence -0.0177 -0.00507 -0.00370 -0.0148 -0.00303 
 (0.0368) (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0368) (0.0369) 
Economic inequality -0.0251 -0.0623 -0.0632 -0.0324 -0.0623 
 (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0526) (0.0524) 
Population (ln) -38.56*** -39.85*** -37.69*** -38.68*** -37.45*** 
 (2.940) (2.938) (2.959) (2.958) (2.950) 
Urbanization -0.137*** -0.152*** -0.155*** -0.139*** -0.151*** 
 (0.0475) (0.0477) (0.0477) (0.0475) (0.0476) 
Political violence 0.422* 0.408* 0.267 0.397* 0.252 
 (0.218) (0.219) (0.221) (0.221) (0.220) 
Communist -4.168 -2.748 -1.289 -5.209* -2.792 
 (2.719) (2.717) (2.684) (2.752) (2.693) 
Under-5 mortality, regional average 0.586*** 0.581*** 0.590*** 0.587*** 0.591*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0222) (0.0220) (0.0221) 
 (4.423) (4.419) (4.437) (4.428) (4.420) 
Electoral regime 11.00***   8.745***  
 (1.650)   (2.068)  
Constant 463.1*** 484.1*** 465.6*** 465.7*** 462.4*** 
 (32.39) (32.41) (32.58) (32.48) (32.49) 
      
Observations 4,415 4,415 4,415 4,415 4,415 
R-squared 0.786 0.784 0.783 0.786 0.784 
Number of countries 148 148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-squared 0.775 0.773 0.773 0.776 0.774 
OLS regressions; fixed country and year effects; time coverage: 1961 – 2006; standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A.6. Effects of Accountability on Infant Mortality, controlling for corruption. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
       
       
Vertical accountability  -9.110***   -7.562***  
  (0.599)   (0.884)  
Foreign aid -0.0403 -0.0395 -0.0479 -0.0475 -0.0337  
 (0.0307) (0.0305) (0.0307) (0.0309) (0.0305)  
GDP/capita (ln) -10.40*** -10.43*** -10.44*** -10.47*** -10.51***  
 (0.768) (0.766) (0.770) (0.773) (0.764)  
Economic growth 0.0350 0.0351 0.0375 0.0350 0.0353  
 (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0231)  
Resource dependence 0.0399* 0.0284 0.0382* 0.0434** 0.0274  
 (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0213)  
Economic inequality -0.0820*** -0.0548* -0.0811*** -0.0858*** -0.0566*  
 (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0308) (0.0305)  
Population (ln) -16.93*** -18.18*** -17.95*** -16.88*** -18.33***  
 (1.595) (1.585) (1.593) (1.611) (1.598)  
Urbanization -0.130*** -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.142*** -0.124***  
 (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0277)  
Political violence 0.350*** 0.450*** 0.398*** 0.310** 0.459***  
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.129) (0.128)  
Communist -1.250 -1.357 -0.569 -0.553 -2.762*  
 (1.611) (1.588) (1.611) (1.642) (1.648)  
Political corruption -9.731*** -13.17*** -9.485*** -6.392*** -15.16***  
 (1.838) (1.906) (1.856) (1.792) (1.949)  
Infant mortality, regional average 0.640*** 0.632*** 0.631*** 0.652*** 0.628***  
 (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0199)  
Accountability -5.024***      
 (0.353)      
Horizontal accountability   -4.465***  -2.600***  
   (0.334)  (0.547)  
Diagonal accountability    -4.113*** 0.933  
    (0.338) (0.595)  
       
       
Constant 273.2*** 278.9*** 282.3*** 270.6*** 282.5***  
 (17.91) (17.83) (17.92) (18.06) (17.88)  
       
Observations 4,355 4,355 4,355 4,355 4,355  
R-squared 0.817 0.819 0.816 0.815 0.820  
Number of country_id 147 147 147 147 147  
Adjusted R-squared 0.808 0.810 0.807 0.806 0.811  
OLS regressions; fixed country and year effects; time coverage: 1961 – 2006; standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Constraining Governments:
Methodological appendix
To develop sub-indices representing vertical, horizontal and diagonal ac-
countability we employ Bayesian structural equation models. We also ag-
gregate these sub-indices using a hierarchical Bayesian analysis to create an
overall measure of accountability.
We construct all indices using indicators from the V-Dem dataset v6.2.
Continuous indicators represent aggregated expert-coded data using the V-
Dem measurement model. At present, we use only the median estimates
across iterations of an MCMC algorithm, though we may incorporate poste-
rior uncertainty about these estimates in future iterations of the project. We
use the statistical software JAGS (Plummer, 2012), implemented in R with
runjags (Denwood, 2016), to estimate all quantities.
1 Sub-indices
We conceptualize accountability as being an aggregation of three conceptually-
distinct forms of accountability: vertical, horizontal, and diagonal. Each of
these forms of accountability are themselves functions of multiple indicators,
which are often hierarchically clustered and contingent upon the presence of
institutions. As a result, we cannot measure any of these latent variables
using a standard factor analysis. This section provides a detailed description
of the construction of the accountability sub-indices.
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1.1 Vertical accountability
Measuring vertical accountability in our framework presents five main con-
ceptual concerns. First, citizens living in a country which does not have an
electoral regime have no opportunity—even in theory—to hold their leader-
ship accountable through the practice of elections. As a result, non-electoral
country-years should have a much lower level of vertical accountability than
country-years in an electoral regime. Second, the quality of elections is of
clear importance to vertical accountability, with the caveat that even the
worst elections are better than none. Third, the percentage of a country’s
population which has the franchise is of clear relevance to its degree of verti-
cal accountability: a government that is only accountable to 10 percent of its
population is not accountable to 90 percent of its population, regardless of
how free and fair its elections are for the chosen 10 percent. Fourth, vertical
accountability is strongest in a political regime where the head of executive is
elected, since such a structure allows citizens to hold even the most powerful
official accountable. Fifth, parties provide structure by which citizens can
hold political officials accountable within a regime, both in the presence and
absence of elections.
As a result, an accurate measure of vertical accountability would take into
account 1) the effect of being an electoral regime, 2) the quality of elections,
3) the percentage of the population to which the franchise has been extended,
4) whether or not the executive is elected and 5) the ability of opposition
parties to challenge a regime.
Our measure of vertical accountability incorporates each of these five
elements into its estimation procedure. We estimate vertical accountability
as directly being a function of 1) having an electoral regime (i.e. elections),
2) the proportion of the population that has suffrage, 3) whether or not the
head of executive is elected. We measure the influence of quality of elections
and parties indirectly: quality of elections is a function of electoral regime
(i.e. we assume non-electoral regimes have lower vertical accountability) and
the activity of opposition parties is hierarchically nested within the overall
measure of vertical accountability. We discuss each of these procedures in
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turn.
First, the equation for the estimated probability of having an electoral
regime is Pr(yi) = φ(ζi), where ζi = β1 + β2ξ
V ertical
i . In this equation, φ
is the CDF of a normal distribution, ξV ertical the estimated level of vertical
accountability for country-year i, which we assume to be distributed N(0, 1).
Accordingly, y is distributed according to a Bernoulli distribution. We model
the nine indicators of election quality—the degree to which elections actually
facilitate vertical accountability—as a function of the linear predictor for
having elections. In mathematical form zij ∼ N(γij, ωj), where γij = κj1 +
κj2ζi, where ζi is the linear predictor of being a electoral regime (the CDF-
transformed probability of having elections).1
This parameterization essentially restricts estimates of non-electoral regimes
to having a lower level of vertical accountability than electoral regimes,2
while allowing election quality to determine the level of vertical accountabil-
ity within electoral regimes (conditional on the other nodes in the model,
such as percent suffrage).
We model the enfranchised proportion of population as being a direct
function of ξV ertical. More precisely, it follows a beta distribution, where
yi ∼ B(µiτ, [1−µi]τ), where µi = α1 +α2ξV erticali and τ a variance parameter
with a vague Γ(1, 1) prior. Since beta distributions are bounded (0,1), we set
country-years with 100 percent suffrage at 0.999 and country-years without
electoral regimes at 0.001. In effect, this procedure serves to further decrease
the level of vertical accountability of countries with low suffrage by position-
ing them in relative proximity to countries without elections. At the same
time, the often-weak correlation between suffrage and measures of election
quality and party strength means that this variable does not overwhelm the
1We interpolate the values of election-quality variables from the previous election for
years in which no election was held. Non-electoral regimes receive NAs for all election-
quality variables, as there is no information about the quality of their (non-existent)
elections, save that it is lower than those of electoral regimes. This strategy necessitates
the use of relatively strong priors on parameter values for β and κ, which we derived
through trial and error.
2The one caveat to this claim is that, if we measured party quality such that this
concept was not correlated with the presence of electoral regimes, this parameterization
would yield incoherent estimates.
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other data in the model in practice.
We directly link the presence of an elected head of executive to ξV ertical.
Given that there are unclear cases where an unelected official shares power
with an elected head of executive—and such regimes generally have lower
levels of vertical accountability than those in which an elected head of exec-
utive has unambiguous power—we model this variable as a standard ordinal
probit model with three levels: head of executive not elected, shared power,
and elected head of executive. The linear predictor is thus θi = λξ
V ertical
i ,
where λ is a scale parameter. Thresholds are distributed according to a
N(0, 1) prior distribution.
Finally, we model the presence and capabilities of political parties as a
separate latent variable that is nested within vertical accountability. This ap-
proach means that individual measures of party activities impact vertical ac-
countability in aggregate (though the hierarchical parameterization privileges
indicators with higher correlation with the underlying concept), preventing
individual measures from overwhelming suffrage, elections and elected head
of state in determining the value of a country-year’s vertical accountability
score. In practice, this strategy means that non-electoral regimes have lower
estimated levels of vertical accountability than electoral regimes, regardless
of the activities of parties.3 More precisely, we model the J = 3 party
variables as being distributed N(χij, σj), where χij = pij1 + pij2η
Parties
i and
ηPartiesi ∼ N(ξV erticali , o). Here o represents a uniform prior that allows the
model to determine the degree to which the party latent variable correlates
with ξV ertical.
Figure 1 presents a path diagram for this index.
1.2 Horizontal accountability
We conceptualize horizontal accountability as a function of four institutions:
an independent investigative body, an executive who respects the constitu-
tions, an independent judiciary, and a legislature that can counter the execu-
3In principle, if there were many non-electoral regimes that allowed opposition parties
to form and operate freely, then there would be more overlap between electoral and non-
electoral regimes in their vertical accountability scores.
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Figure 1: Vertical accountability path diagram
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tive. We model both the activities of the independent investigative body and
the degree to which an executive respects the constitution as directly influ-
encing horizontal accountability; the activities of a legislature is a function
of the presence of a legislature. the activities of the judiciary are a nested
latent variable.
We use standard models to parameterize the direct measures: yij ∼
N(µij, τj), where µij = j1 + j2ξ
Horizontal
i , ξ
Horizontal representing horizontal
accountability in country-year i. τ and  are precision and loading parame-
ters for j = 2 manifest variables. In this parameterization, the assumption
is that a country that does not have an external investigative body is ex-
changeable with countries that do–that is, any countries with missing values
for this variable will have values imputed based on the degree to which they
have independent courts, active legislatures and executives who respect the
constitution.
Our model for the activities of a legislature follows a similar pattern as
that for the quality of elections. More precisely, we model the degree to
which a legislature 1) investigates in practice and 2) questions the executive
as functions of the linear predictor for the presence of the legislature. This
parameterization implies that countries that do not have legislatures have
lower values of horizontal accountability than countries that do, though in
principle the other elements of this model could overwhelm this general re-
striction. In mathematical form, Pr(yi) = φ(ζi), where ζi = β1+β2ξ
Horizontal
i .
In this equation, φ is the CDF of a normal distribution, ξHorizontal the
N(0, 1) estimated level of horizontal accountability for country-year i, and
y is distributed according to a Bernoulli distribution. In turn, the degree
to which a legislature investigates the executive is zij ∼ N(γij, ωj), where
γij = κj1 + κj2ζi, where ζi in the linear predictor of a legislature existing
and j = 2 κ and ω parameters for both variables reflecting the activities of
a legislature.
Finally, we model judicial accountability as being a latent variable ηJudiciaryi ∼
N(ξHorizontali , o), with its variables following a standard latent variable form,
i.e. yij ∼ N(ξij, σj), where ξij = pij1 + pij2ηJudiciaryi . As with parties in
vertical accountability, this approach treats judiciary variables as having a
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Figure 2: Horizontal accountability path diagram
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largely cumulative impact on horizontal accountability, though the model
weights individual judiciary variables with regard to the overall horizontal
measure.
Figure 2 presents the path diagram for horizontal accountability.
1.3 Diagonal accountability
We conceptualize diagonal accountability as a hierarchical latent variable
model. Specifically, we argue that diagonal accountability is a function of
four institutions: media freedom, freedom of expression, civil society organi-
zations, and an engaged society. All of these institutions, save an engaged
society, are themselves latent variables that manifest in 3-6 variables each.
More precisely, yijk ∼ N(ξijk, σjk), where ξijk = pijk1 + pijk2ηji . Here, y rep-
resents the manifest variable for country-year i, institution j (j representing
civil society, freedom of expression or media freedom) and institution-variable
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k (k = 1, 2, 3 for civil society, k = 1, ..., 4 for freedom of expression, and
k = 1, ..., 6 and media freedom), and σ precision parameters for each mani-
fest variable with a vague prior distribution. Each η for country-year i and
institution j is distributed N(ξDiagonali , oj), where ξ
Diagonal is the degree of di-
agonal accountability in country-year i and o an institution-specific precision
parameter. Engaged society is the only institution with a single manifest
variable, and we therefore model it as a standard latent variable manifest
variable, i.e. yi ∼ (µi, τ) where yi = η1 + η2ξDiagonali and τ a precision pa-
rameter with a vague prior distribution. Figure 3 presents the path diagram
for this latent variable.
2 Aggregate indices
To create an aggregate measure of accountability, we conduct a hierarchical
analysis using the sub-index models from the preceding section. This measure
simply involves estimating ξji ∼ N(ιi, ρj), where ξ represents sub-index j =
V ertical,Horizontal,Diagonal and observation i, ι representing the measure
of overall accountability, and ρ a sub-index-specific measure of precision. This
strategy assumes that overall accountability is a function of all variables
included in the model, though the sub-indices structure this relationship.
Figure 4 illustrates this conceptualization.
3 Analysis of loadings and uniqueness
Table 1 presents the factor loadings and uniqueness parameters for different
forms of accountability. Bold text denotes different forms of accountability
and models, plain text nodes of a given form of accountability and italicized
text variables that are functions of the linear predictor of another factor. All
quantities are 95 percent HPD intervals across MCMC draws. Λ represents
factor loadings, with Λ1 the loading for a vector of ones and Λ2 the loading
for the latent variable. Ψ represents uniqueness parameters in the form of
a precision parameter (i.e. the inverse of the estimated standard deviation):
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Figure 3: Diagonal accountability path diagram
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Figure 4: Accountability path diagram
Diagonal
Vertical HorizontalAccountability
higher values represent a higher degree of correlation.
The table indicates that all indicators have relatively high loadings, though
the multiplicative relationship between the structural equation models must
be accounted for interpreting the reported loadings. The case of Vertical
accountability is illustrative. While the loadings for electoral regime down-
stream variables have small λ2 values, this result is a function of the parama-
terization of the model: Electoral regime has extremely high loading values
which, when multiplied by the downstream values of Λ2, yield high loadings.
A similar pattern holds true for Horizontal accountability: the high loading
for Legislature investigates compensates for the relatively low loading of Leg-
islature exists is relatively. Equally importantly, the generally high values of
the uniqueness parameters indicate that the relevant latent variables explain
a great deal of variation.
Table 2 presents the factor loadings from the full hierarchical model.
Note that all three sub-indices—especially social and vertical—have very
high precision parameters, indicating strong correlation. In general the factor
loadings of individual indicators do not change greatly, with the exception of
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Table 1: Factor loadings and uniqueness parameters for forms of account-
ability
Λ1 Λ2 Ψ
Vertical
Percent suffrage (0.08, 0.11) (0.61, 0.64) (0.59, 0.61)a
Elected head of executive τ1: (-0.16, -0.08) τ2:(-0.10, -0.02)
b (1.54, 1.63) c
Electoral regime (4.01, 5.10) (8.75,11.00) c
EMB autonomy (-2.17, -2.10) (0.21, 0.26) (2.18, 2.35)
EMB capacity (-1.38, -1.30) (0.15. 0.19) (1.06, 1.13)
Election voter registry (-1.52, -1.44) (0.16, 0.20) (1.22, 1.30)
Election vote buying (-1.01, -0.90) (0.11, 0.14) (0.58, 0.61)
Election irregularities (-1.69, -1.61) (0.17, 0.21) (1.07, 1.14)
Election intimidation (-1.83, -1.75) (0.18, 0.23) (1.63, 1.74)
Electoral violence (-0.51, -0.43) (0.10, 0.12) (0.87, 0.92)
Election free and fair (-2.20, -2.12) (0.21, 0.26) (2.17, 2.33)
Election multiparty (-1.88, -1.79) (0.18, 0.23) (1.17. 1.24)
Parties (Ψ = (2.11, 2.32))
Party ban (-0.10, -0.05) (1.21, 1.25) (1.70, 1.81)
Barriers to parties (-0.00, 0.05) (1.31, 1.35) (2.55, 2.78)
Opposition autonomy (0.08, 0.13) (1.28, 1.32) (1.92, 2.06)
Horizontal
Executive respects constitution (0.14, 0.18) (1.07, 1.10) (1.36, 1.44)
Other bodies question (-0.40, -0.35) (1.25, 1.29) (2.54, 2.72)
Judiciary (Ψ=(1.69, 1.88))
Compliance with judiciary (0.09, 0.13) (0.96, 0.99) (2.29, 2.55)
Compliance with high court (0.23, 0.27) (0.94, 0.98) (1.95, 2.15)
Higher court independence (-0.03, 0.01) (0.85, 0.89) (1.51, 1.64)
Lower court independence (0.07, 0.12) (0.85, 0.89) (1.38, 1.50)
Legislature exists (0.71, 0.75) (0.43, 0.49) c
Legislature investigates (-2.67, -2.42) (2.87, 3.22) (3.62, 3.98)
Legislature questions (-1.82, -1.61) (2.26, 2.55) (1.45, 1.53)
Diagonal
Engaged society (-0.38, -0.34) (1.25, 1.28) (1.88, 1.97)
Freedom of discussion (Ψ = (9.37, 10.37))
Freedom of discussion (men) (-0.02, 0.03) (1.48, 1.52) (6.59, 7.14)
Freedom of discussion (women) (-0.16, -0.11) (1.41, 1.44) (4.03, 4.26)
Academic and cultural expression (0.03, 0.08) (1.33, 1.37) (1.97, 2.07)
Internet censorship (-0.29, -0.22) (1.15, 1.21) (2.06, 2.28)
Media freedom (Ψ = (13.94, 15.60))
Media bias (-0.27, -0.22) (1.46, 1.50) (2.70, 2.84)
Critical media (-0.21, -0.16) (1.47, 1.51) (2.73, 2.88)
Media perspectives (-0.26, -0.22) (1.38, 1.42) (2.80, 2.95)
Media censorship (-0.11, -0.06) (1.31, 1.34) (2.25, 2.36)
Journalist harassment (-0.29, -0.24) (1.34, 1.38) (1.78, 1.86)
Media self-censorship (-0.23, -0.19) (1.26, 1.29) (2.01, 2.11)
Civil society (Ψ = (28.83, 36.74))
Government repression (0.08, 0.13) (1.32, 1.35) (2.67, 2.82)
Popular participation (-0.07, -0.03) (1.19, 1.23) (1.51, 1.58)
Openness to entry and exit (-0.03, 0.02) (1.45, 1.49) (3.74, 4.00)
aVariance parameter for a gamma-distributed manifest variable. bThresholds for ordinal probit model. cProbit models
without uniqueness parameter. Italics represents variables in original model, bold structural portions of model.
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those in vertical accountability. Since parties correlate strongly with other
measures of accountability (i.e. parties in some sense perform a similar role
as civil society and other measures of diagonal accountability), their relative
impact on vertical accountability scores increase, while the overall impact of
elections decreases.
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Table 2: Factor loadings and uniqueness parameters for hierarchical account-
ability
Ψ
Vertical (13.91, 16.69)
Horizontal (7.19, 8.18)
Diagonal (9.74, 11.13)
Λ1 Λ2 Ψ
Vertical
Percent suffrage (0.06, 0.09) (0.44, 0.46) (0.47, 0.49)a
Elected head of executive 1: (-0.23, -0.17) 2: (-0.18, -0.12)b (1.10, 1.17) c
Electoral regime (0.79, 0.88) (1.45, 1.56) c
EMB autonomy (-1.48, -1.40) (1.09, 1.17) (2.50, 2.68)
EMB capacity (-0.81, -0.74) (0.75, 0.81) (0.97, 1.03)
Election voter registry (-0.91, -0.84) (0.79, 0.85) (1.11, 1.17)
Election vote buying (-0.49, -0.40) (0.52, 0.57) (0.53, 0.56)
Election irregularities (-1.04, -0.96) (0.81, 0.87) (0.93, 0.98)
Election intimidation (-1.19, -1.12) (0.93, 1.01) (1.65, 1.76)
Electoral violence (-0.09, -0.02) (0.45, 0.50) (0.81, 0.85)
Election free and fair (-1.48, -1.41) (1.07, 1.15) (2.25, 2.40)
Election multiparty (-1.31, -1.24) (0.95, 1.03) (1.40, 1.49)
Parties (Ψ=(4.78, 5.30))
Party ban (-0.10, -0.05) (1.30, 1.34) (1.69, 1.79)
Barriers to parties (-0.00, 0.05) (1.40, 1.44) (2.38, 2.55)
Opposition autonomy (0.08, 0.13) (1.37, 1.42) (2.08, 2.22)
Horizontal
Executive respects constitution (0.13, 0.18) (0.95, 0.99) (1.17, 1.23)
Other bodies question (-0.54, -0.49) (1.18, 1.22) (2.17, 2.30)
Judiciary (Ψ=(1.52, 1.68))
Compliance with judiciary (0.09, 0.13) (0.85, 0.89) (1.69, 1.91)
Compliance with high court (0.23, 0.27) (0.84, 0.88) (1.52, 1.69)
Higher court independence (-0.03, 0.01) (0.85, 0.89) (1.89, 2.14)
Lower court independence (0.07, 0.12) (0.85, 0.89) (1.72, 1.94)
Legislature exists (0.93, 1.00) (0.86, 0.95) c
Legislature investigates (-1.93, -1.84) (1.40, 1.53) (3.09, 3.34)
Legislature questions (-1.29, -1.20) (1.15, 1.26) (1.59, 1.68)
Diagonal
Engaged society (-0.38, -0.34) (1.20, 1.24) (2.00, 2.10)
Freedom of discussion (Ψ = (8.68, 9.58))
Freedom of discussion (men) (-0.02, 0.03) (1.41, 1.45) (6.42, 6.96)
Freedom of discussion (women) (-0.16, -0.11) (1.35, 1.38) (4.11, 4.36)
Academic and cultural expression (0.03, 0.07) (1.27, 1.31) (1.97, 2.07)
Internet censorship (-0.29, -0.22) (1.10, 1.16) (2.05, 2.28)
Media freedom (Ψ = (13.14, 14.72))
Media bias (-0.28, -0.23) (1.39, 1.43) (2.70, 2.85)
Critical media (-0.21, -0.16) (1.41, 1.45) (2.75, 2.89)
Media perspectives (-0.26, -0.22) (1.32, 1.36) (2.79, 2.94)
Media censorship (-0.11, -0.07) (1.25, 1.29) (2.27, 2.38)
Journalist harassment (-0.29, -0.24) (1.28, 1.32) (1.78, 1.87)
Media self-censorship (-0.23, -0.19) (1.20, 1.24) (1.99, 2.08)
Civil society (Ψ = (19.71, 23.45))
Government repression (0.08, 0.13) (1.25, 1.28) (2.64, 2.78)
Popular participation in civil society (-0.07, -0.03) (1.13, 1.17) (1.53, 1.60)
Openness to entry and exit (-0.03, 0.02) (1.38, 1.42) (3.73, 3.99)
aVariance parameter for a gamma-distributed manifest variable. bThresholds for ordinal probit model. cProbit models
without uniqueness parameter.
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Table 3: Additional statistics for accountability
Correlation SE R2
Vertical 0.99 0.00 0.98
Horizontal 0.97 0.00 0.95
Diagonal 0.98 0.00 0.96
Vertical
Electoral regime
EMB autonomy 0.76 0.01 0.47
EMB capacity 0.62 0.01 0.32
Election voter registry 0.65 0.01 0.35
Election vote buying 0.44 0.01 0.16
Election irregularities 0.64 0.01 0.34
Election intimidation 0.71 0.01 0.42
Electoral violence 0.46 0.01 0.17
Election free and fair 0.74 0.01 0.47
Election multiparty 0.67 0.01 0.37
Parties 0.88 0.00 0.77
Party ban 0.92 0.00 0.84
Barriers to parties 0.96 0.00 0.92
Opposition autonomy 0.95 0.00 0.87
Horizontal
Executive respects constitution 0.83 0.00 0.69
Other bodies question 0.88 0.00 0.83
Judiciary 0.86 0.00 0.74
Compliance with judiciary 0.92 0.00 0.85
Compliance with high court 0.90 0.00 0.81
Higher court independence 0.84 0.00 0.71
Lower court independence 0.83 0.00 0.68
Legislature exists
Legislature investigates 0.92 0.00 0.90
Legislature questions 0.78 0.01 0.66
Diagonal
Engaged society 0.88 0.00 0.78
Freedom of discussion 0.97 0.00 0.95
Freedom of discussion (men) 0.98 0.00 0.97
Freedom of discussion (women) 0.96 0.00 0.93
Academic and cultural expression 0.91 0.00 0.82
Internet censorship 0.53 0.01 0.40
Media freedom 0.98 0.00 0.97
Media bias 0.94 0.00 0.89
Critical media 0.94 0.00 0.89
Media perspectives 0.94 0.00 0.88
Media censorship 0.55 0.01 0.40
Journalist harassment 0.90 0.00 0.80
Media self-censorship 0.89 0.00 0.80
Civil society 1.00 0.00 0.99
Government repression 0.93 0.00 0.86
Popular participation in civil society 0.85 0.00 0.72
Openness to entry and exit 0.96 0.00 0.93
Results report the correlation between a variable and the the latent variable to which it directly corresponds. For
example, election variable results correspond to vertical accountability and the relevant manifest variable, while party
variable results correspond to the parties latent variable and the relevant manifest variable. All results correspond to
independently -estimated latent variables, save for the component latent variables, which related to the overall
hierarchical model.
71
